THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF ISWAR KRISHNA

THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF ISWARA KRISHNA

AN EXPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM OF KAPILA

WITH

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS

Translated with Commentary

BY

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I WISH to present to my readers the philosophy of Kapila as it has been set forth by his Indian exponent, Iswara Krishna. The system of Kapila, called the Sankhya or Rationalistic, in its original form, and in its theistic development by Patanjali, contains nearly all that India has produced in the department of pure philosophy. Other systems, though classed as philosophic, are mainly devoted to logic and physical science, or to an exposition of the Vedas.

The system of Kapila may be said to have only an historical value, but on this account alone it is interesting as a chapter in the history of the human mind. It is the earliest attempt on record to give an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the world, the nature and relations of man, and his future destiny. It is interesting, also, and instructive to note how often the human mind moves in a circle. The latest German philosophy, the system of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, is mainly a reproduction of the philosophic system of Kapila in its materialistic part, presented in a more elaborate form, but on the same fundamental lines. In this respect the human intellect has gone over the same ground that it occupied more than two thousand years ago, but on a more important question it has taken a step in retreat. Kapila recognised fully the existence of a soul in man, forming indeed his proper nature—the absolute Ego of Fichte—distinct from matter and immortal ; but our latest philosophy, both here and in Germany, can see in man only a highly developed physical organisation. "All external things," says Kapila, "were formed that the soul might know itself and be free." "The study of psychology is vain," says Schopenhauer, "for there is no Psyche."

CONTENTS

APPENDIX

NOTE A

NOTE B

NOTE C

NOTE D

KAPILA, THE AUTHOR OF THE SANKHYA SYSTEM

THE imagination of the Hindus has thrown a veil of mystery and fable around Kapila, the traditional author of the Sankhya philosophy. So much reverence gradually attached to his name, that he was sometimes called "the divine Kapila," and was said to have been a son of Brahma, the creative form of Brahma,[1] an incarnation of Vishnu,[2] or a form of Agni, though born as a son of Vitatha and Devahuti ;[3] one of the great rishis or ancient sages; a descendant of the great lawgiver Manu; and to have been endowed with knowledge, virtue, freedom from passion, and supernatural power at the time of his birth. We can only say that he was probably a Brahman, who, being disgusted with the prevailing beliefs and practices of his time, wrought out for himself a system by which he hoped to solve the mysteries connected with spirit and matter by reason alone. His memory survives only in his system ; for of the details of his life or of the time when he lived we have no certain account. It is probable that he lived in the seventh or eighth century before Christ. He is said to have been born at Pushkara, a sacred bathing-place near Ajmeer, and to have dwelt at Ganga Sagar ;[4] but there is no reliable evidence

[1] See Gaudapada's Commentary on the S. Karika, Wilson's ed., p. 1; Colebrooks, ii. 242.

[2] "In his (Vishnu's) fifth manifestation, he (in the form of) Kapila and Lord of Saints, declared to Asuri the Sankhya (doctrine), which defines the series of principles, and which had been lost through the lapse of time" (Bhag. Purana, i. 3, 10; Muir, iii. 192; Vishnu Purana, iii. 2, 18; Bhag. Gita, x. 26).

[3] In the Bhag. Purana, however, Kapila is said to have had nine sisters, all born to Kardama by his wife Devahuti (ii. 7, 3; iii. 33, 1).

[4] In the Padma Purana he is said to have dwelt in the village of Indraprastha (F. Hall, Introduction to S. Sara, p. 20).

in support of either statement. It seems to be certain that he was born in Northern India, and at some time before the birth of the great reformer Gautama Buddha, the date of whose death has been generally assigned to 544 B.C.; for in the Pali Dathavamsa, Buddha is said to have been born in the city of Kapila, and that this city, called *Kapila-vastu,* had been built by the sons of Ikshvaku, by the permission of the sage Kapila, and that it was near the Himalaya mountains (i. 20). An indefinite antiquity was sometimes assigned to the system. In the first book of the Mahabharata, Narada is said to have taught the thousand sons of Daksha the doctrine of final deliverance (from matter), the surpassing knowledge of the Sankhya,[5] and he is reckoned as one of of the Prajapatis, or first progenitors of mankind.

Tradition affirms that Kapila lived as a recluse—he is called a *Muni* in Bhag. G., x. 1. 52—and that he possessed a supernatural power, not always used with philosophic calmness. In the Ramayana (i. 36—44) we are told, with true Oriental exaggeration, that the sixty thousand sons of Sagara, a king of Ayodhya (Oudh), were directed by their father to go in search of a horse that had been stolen by a Rakshasa (demon) at an *aswamedha* (horse-sacrifice). Meeting with Kapila in their search, they accused him of the theft, and the charge so enraged him that he reduced them immediately to ashes.[6]

It does not appear that Kapila separated himself entirely from the Brahmanic system. It has been said that he "proclaimed the authority of revelation as paramount to reasoning and experience."[7] This, however, is contrary to the main principle of his system, which upholds a knowledge of philosophy as the only way of obtaining the deliverance of the soul from matter. He denies that such a result can be obtained from the Vedas; for they are impure, as ordaining sacrifice, and insufficient for the attain-

[5] Adi-parvan, 3131; Sans. Texts, i. 125.

[6] Sankara says, however, that it was another Kapila, named also Vasudeva [a name of Krishna], who destroyed the sons of Sagara (Commentary on the Brahma Sutra, ii. 1, 1; Sans. T., iii. 190).

[7] Sanskrit Literature, p. 83.

ment of this great purpose. He allows "valid testimony" to be one method of proof; and his Vedantist expounders have interpreted this to be an acknowledgment of the divine origin and authority of the Vedas, but there is no ground for such a statement. The common designation of his system as Niriswara (godless or atheistical) is a sufficient indication that it did not acknowledge a Supreme Lord or a divine revelation. The eminent Vedantist commentator, Sankara, rightly estimated the position of the Sankhya system with regard to the Vedas. In his commentary on the Brahma Sutras he discusses this subject, and concludes: "Hence it is proved that Kapila's system is at variance with the Veda, and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakriti (Nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls" (Sans. T., iii. 190). The system of Kapila, if it had been generally adopted, would have been as fatal to the Vedantist ritual and doctrine as that of Gautama Buddha, which was the natural result or logical issue of the earlier system. In each, knowledge and meditation took the place of religious rites; but Kapila established no society and no hierarchy; he knew nothing of sympathy with mankind in general; he addressed himself to thinkers like himself; and to these alone. Hence his system remained only as a philosophical theory, affecting the whole course of Hindu thought in some respects, chiefly in its physical speculations, but never attaining to a practical supremacy over large masses of men. It was never embodied and crystallised in a concrete form, and as a complete system it has been preserved only as an intellectual product, or as an esoteric doctrine, understood and accepted by a small inner circle of free-thinking men.

It has often been misunderstood. Cousin asserted that it was a pure materialism, though the soul is represented in it as holding a kind of royal supremacy, and all material things are subservient to it. Another writer states, on the contrary, that in this system "souls alone are regarded as substances, whatever affects the soul being ranged under the head of a quality; 1. pleasing; 2. displeasing; or 3. indifferent." The Gunas, however, are not qualities, but constituent elements, of Prakriti,

as real in their nature as the soul, and having like it an eternal existence.[8]

The term *sānkhya* is from the noun *sankhyā,* number, and also calculation, reasoning. In the Mahabharata it is said: "They (the Sankhyas) exercise reason (*sankhyā*) and discuss Nature and the twenty-four principles, and are therefore called Sānkhya." Vijnana Bhikshu, in his commentary, explains the noun *sankhya* as meaning "discrimination," "the setting forth of spirit as distinct from matter (*Prakriti*)." Sankaracharya gives a similar interpretation (Comm. on the Vishnu-sahasranaman; Introd. to Sankhya Sara, by F. Hall). The course of ideas seems to be from number to discrimination, and then to a discriminating judgment, a result of reasoning.

The doctrines of the Sankhya system have been set forth in many well-known treatises, and on these many commentaries have been written.

1. The *Sankhya-Pravachana* (Exposition of the Sankhya), or Sankhya Sutras, a work which has been attributed, but erroneously, to Kapila. It appears to be comparatively modern, for it is not mentioned by Sankaracharya, who lived probably in the seventh or eighth century A.D.; by Vachaspati Misra; or even by the author of the *Sarva-darsana-sangraha,* who is supposed to have lived in the fourteenth century.[9] The most important commentary on this work is the *Sankhya-pravachana-bhashya,* by by Vijnana Bhikshu, probably written in the sixteenth century.

2. The *Tattwa-Samasa,* or Compendium of Principles, a smaller work, also assigned by some, but incorrectly, to Kapila.

3. The *Sankhya-Sara,* written by Vijnana Bhikshu. It has been lately edited by Fitz-Edward Hall, who has prefixed to it a valuable introduction.

4. The *Sankhya-Karika* (Exposition of the Sankhya), by

[8] The Sankhya philosophy, whatever may be its merits or demerits, is rarely presented in a correct form by Western writers. Schluter in describing it says, "Das Selbstbewusstsein (Ahankara) ist erzeugt und nicht zeugend" (Aristotle's Metaph. eine Toch. de Sankhya-Lehre, p. 11). It is, on the contrary, from consciousness, or conscious mind-matter, that the subtle essences of material forms proceed, and from these the gross, visible, manifold forms of sensuous existence.

[9] Introd. to Sank. Sara, p. 9.

Iswara Krishna. This is a work of high authority on the subject, and appears to be the oldest exposition of Kapila's philosophy that has come down to the present time. An edition of this work was published at Bonn in 1832 by Lassen, with a Latin translation and notes. It was also translated by H. T. Colebrooke, and this translation was adopted by Wilson in an edition published by the Oriental Society, to which the commentary of Gaudapada, with explanations, was added. It has also been translated into German by Windischmann and Lorinser, and into French by Pautier and St. Hilaire. The latter has added a very extensive commentary.

It consists of seventy-two distichs or slokas, each expressing in general a distinct principle or dogma. 'The last three, however, are not connected with the exposition of the Sankhya system, and are probably a late addtion. It is written in the Arya or Gatha metre.[10]

It is this work which is now presented to my readers in a new translation with notes, and also occasionally with references to other systems where they coincide with parts of the system of Kapila. It may seem hazardous to attempt the translation of a work which is confessedly obscure and difficult, after the labours of such eminent Sanskrit scholars as Lassen and H. T. Colebrooke; but neither of them has, I think, interpreted the Hindu system, or this exposition of it, with perfect accuracy. I have had, however, the benefit of their labours, of the occasional remarks of Wilson on Colebrooke's translation, and of the criticism of Fitz-Edward Hall on Wilson's work with unnecessary harshness, forgetting that those who follow the footsteps of pioneers in a difficult country may be able to make the path somewhat more distinct than it was before, without possessing as much skill and energy as those who led the way. I have adopted Wilson's translation of Gaudapada's commentary, except in a few instances, where I think he has failed to aprehend its right meaning, or the real nature of Kapila's system, which he admits, in his preface, he had not previously studied.

[10] Williams, Sans. Gram., p. 354, 2d. ed.

ISWARA KRISHNA'S SANKHYA KARIKA

1. "FROM the injurious effects of the threefold kinds of pain (arises) a desire to know the means of removing it (pain). If, from the visible (means of removing it), this (desire) should seem to be superfluous, it is not so, for these are neither absolutely complete nor abiding."[1]

[1] The first distich is obscure. I subjoin a transliteration of the text (adopting Lassen's reading in the first line, *apaghatake,* which is found in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrika), with the translations of Colebrooke and others:—

du'khatrayabhighatajjijnasa tadapaghatake hetau
drishtesaparthachennaikantatyantato' bhavat.

Colebrooke :—"The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain, for pain is embarrassment. Nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished."

Lassen :—"E tergeminorum dolorum impetu (oritur) desiderium cognoscendæ rationis qua ii depellantur. Quod (cognoscendi desiderium) licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti et omni ævo superstitis (remedii)."

St. Hilaire :—"La philosophie consiste a guerir les trois especes de douleurs. Si l'on pretend qu'il existe des moyens materiels de les guerir, et que, par consequent, la philosophie est inutile, on se trompe, car il n'est pas un seul de ces moyens qui soit absolu ni definitiv."

Fitz-Edward Hall :—"Because of the discomposure *that comes* from threefold pain *there arises* a desire to learn the means of doing away therewith *effectually.* If *it be objected, that* visible *means to this end being available,* such *desire* is needless, I demur; for that *these means do* not entirely and for ever *work immunity from discomposure*" (Introd. to S. Sara, p. 26).

Colebrooke's version of the first part of the distich is not very accurate, and *abhighata* is not "embarrassment," though Professor Wilson supports this rendering, and censures Lassen for translating it by the Latin *impetus.* It is composed of *abhi* = Gr. *αμφi,* and *han,* for *ghan,* to strike, to slay. In the Peters. Dict. it is explained as *schlag, angriff, beschadigung.* Lassen was confessedly mistaken in his version of the second part. Hall's is the truest version, but *abhighata* is much more than "discomposure."

The first distich gives the chief, if not the sole, purpose of Kapila's philosophy. It is to relieve mankind from the suffering of pain. It is founded on the gloomy view of human life which is generally accepted by Hindu writers. They assert an absolute pessimism. Our present life is not a blessing; it is only a wearisome burden, which is generally cast off when the soul has become free from all contact with matter. The soul then gains, according to Kapila, an absolute independence, a self-existence, which is not affected by any subsequent changes in the outer material world; or it is absorbed, according to the theistic system of Patanjali, into the essence of the One Supreme Being (Brahma).

The three kinds of pain are explained by the commentators to be—

1. The natural and intrinsic, both bodily and mental (*adhyatmika*).
2. The natural and extrinsic (*adhibhautika*).
3. The divine or supernatural (*adhidaivika*).

The first includes bodily disease and mental infirmity or suffering. The second includes all pain derived from external causes of every kind. The third, as Gaudapada interprets it, may be either divine or atmospheric; "in the latter case, it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like." This, however, belongs to the second division. According to Vachaspati Misra, the third kind is 'from the influence of the planetary bodies, or by being possessed by impure spirits, such as Yakshas, Rakshasas, &c." But, in old time, the gods of a higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*).[2]

The visible remedies for pain, such as medicine, or earthly enjoyments, are not absolute or wholly complete, nor are they

[2] "O Rudra, who bearest away One! to me." So Apollo sent the the disease (rapas) sent by the plague into the camp of the Greeks (other) gods, be gracious, O mighty (Iliad, i. 42).

eternal; for they do not procure that entire separation of the soul from matter which is an absolute condition of its perfect deliverance from pain.

2. "The revealed (means) are like the visible (*i.e.*, inefficient), for they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess. A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested (forms of matter), the Unmanifested (Prakriti or primeval matter), and the knowing (Soul)."

By "revelation" the Vedas are meant, which were supposed to have been heard by wise men (*rishis*) as a divine communication, and hence were called Sruti (hearing).[3] In the judgment of Kapila the Vedic system was not perfectly efficient; for (1.) it was impure. It required sacrifice, and thus the blood of animals was shed, often to a great extent. In the Aswamedha (horse-sacrifice) more than a hundred horses might be sacrificed at one time. According to the Brahmans, this would avail "to expiate all sin, even the murder of a Brahman,"[4] and would confer supernatural power; but to Kapila all such rites were impure. (2.) It was connected with destruction. The Vedic system could not give that final exemption from all material conditions without which there must still be a destruction and renewal of bodily life. (3.) It was excessive or unequal, for all men are not wealthy enough to offer costly sacrifices to the gods, and thus the rich man may have more and the poor man less than is due to his individual merit. The Vedas say indeed that there is "no return (to bodily life) for one who has attained to the state of Brahma;" but in the school of Kapila this blessedness is reserved for those who may attain in the heaven of Brahma to a discriminating knowledge of soul and matter.[5]

This is the leading principle of Kapila's system. The complete and final blessedness of the soul, which consists of an

[3] "By *sruti* is meant the Veda, and by *smriti* (tradition, lit. remembrance), the institutes of law (*dharmasastra*). These are not to be oppugned by heterodox arguments (contrary to the Mimansa or Vedantist exposition), for from them all law or duty (*dharma*) has proceeded" (Manu, ii. 10).

[4] Gaudapada's Commentary on this distich.

[5] Sank. Prav., i. 83, 84; vi. 58.

abolute self-existence, cannot be gained by any religious rites. It is obtaintd by knowledge, and yet not by every kind of knowledge: it can only be gained by a knowledge of philosophy (which Kapila expounds), and this treats of existence in three forms:—(1.) Manifested or developed matter (*Vyakta*); (2.) the Unmanifested or primal matter, called Prakriti or Pradhana (*Avyakta*);[6] and (3.) the knowing Soul (*Jna.*)

This theory of being is unfolded in the following distich and the 22d, which may be brought together for a full exhibition of the system:

3. "Nature (*Prakrit*), the root (of material forms), is not produced. The Great One (*Mahat=Buddhi* or Intellect) and the rest (which spring from it) are seven (substances), producing and produced. Sixteen are productions[7] (only). Soul is neither producing nor produced."

Matter in its primal form (*Prakriti*) is external and self-existing. From it all things emanate, except Soul, which has an independent existence, and is eternal, both *a parte ante* and *a parte post.*

From Prakriti proceed: (1.) Intellect (*Mahat* or *Buddhi*), the substance or essence by which the soul obtains a knowledge of external things. It is material,[8] but of the subtlest form of matter. In the system of Kapila, everything connected in function with sensuous objects is as material as the objects themselves, being equally an emanation fsom Prakriti. The soul exists as a

[6] In the Institutes of Manu this is an appellation of the Supreme Being. "Then the self-existent Lord, unmanifested (*avyakta*) caused all this universe, with the great principles of being, and the rest, to appear" (i. 6).

Prakriti resembles the one universal invisible substance or being of the Platonists, from which all material forms have sprung.

"Gk. *Dio de ten tou gegonotos horatou kai pantos aisthetou metera kai hupodokhen mete gen mete aera mete pur, mete hudos legomen, mete hosa ek touton mete ex on tauta gegonen, all' anoraton eidos ti kai amorphon pandekhes.*

[7] Properly "modifications" (*vikara*). There are only developments from a primary form, and have no developing power.

[8] Modern science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function, are at bottom names for the same substance" .(Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3d ed., p. 38).

pure inward light,[9] without any instrumentation by which it can become cognisant of the external world. This instrumentation has been supplied, but it is foreign to the soul, and as objective to it, as any other form of matter.

From Intellect (*Buddhi*) proceeds Consciousness[10] or Egoism (*Ahankara*); a consequence resembling that of Descartes: "Cogito, ergo sum." Self-consciousness is not, however, in the system of Kapila, a corollary of thought, but inherent in it; or, as W. Hamilton has expressed the same idea, "Consciousness and knowledge each involves the other."[11] It is the same thing in another form, for cause and effect are identical according to Kapila, as water issuing from its source is still the same in reality though not in form. By *Ahankara* Kapila means a substance or *ens* connected with thought (Buddhi), in which consciousness inheres. It is nearly equivalent to the "mind-stuff" which Clifford assumed as the original ground of all being, *i.e.*, of all formal being; a synthesis of mind and grosser matter in which consciousness was produced, by which the existence of conscious and unconscious beings was made possible, and was finally developed.

From Ahankara or Consciousness proceed the five subtle elements (*tanmatra*) which are the primary forms or essences of gross material things, *i.e.*, of all formal life. This might seem to be as pure an idealism as that of Berkeley or Fichte; but there is no idealism in the system of Kapila. Both Consciousness and all existing external forms have a real objective being independent of the soul. In one respect he coincides with the views of Kant, for both agree that we have no knowledge of an external world, except as by the action of our faculties it is represented to the

[9] Comp. Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute: "Es ist das Licht, welches leuchtet; aber eben keinen andern Inhalt hat, als eben das Licht" (Phil. der Rel., i. 117).

[10] "There are not two worlds, a world of nature and a world of human consciousness, standing over against one another, but one world of nature whereof human consciousness is an evolution" (Maudsley, p. 57). A dogmatic assertion, but only of a theory, as yet unproved, though offered at first more than 2000 years ago.

[11] Metaphysics, i. 193.

soul,* and take as granted the objective reality of our sense-perseptions.[12] In one respect there seems to be in the Hindu theory a germ of the system of Hegel, in which subject and object are made one by an absolute synthesis; for the substratum of thought and consciousness and of the external world is the same in kind, since elementary substances issue from consciousness, and consciousness proceeds from intellect (*Buddhi*). There would be some resemblance if the system of Kapila ended with Nature (*Prakriti*). But there is still a dualism. The soul is different in kind from all material things, and will finally be severed from them by an eternal separation. When finally separated from matter, including intellect and all the forms or emanations of Prakriti, it will have no object, and no function, of thought. It will remain self-existent and isolated in a state of passive and eternal repose.

* There is room for the supposition that even the ultimate particles of matter may be permeable to the causes of attractions of various kinds, especially if those causes are immaterial ; nor is there anything in the unprejudiced study of physical philosophy that can induce us to doubt the existence of immaterial substances; on the contrary, we see analogies which lead us almost directly to such an opinion. The electrical fluid is supposed to be essentially different from common matter ; the general medium of light and heat, according to some, or the principle of caloric, according to others, is equally distinct from it" (Thomas Young, Unseen Universe, p. 160). The authors of this work would substitute "not grossly material" for "immaterial," and "gross matter" for "matter" in the passage quoted. They correspond to the *tanmatra* and *mahabhuta* of Kapila.

"Bedenkt man dass diese Natur and sich nichts als ein Inbegriff von Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an sich, sondern blos eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemuth's sei, so wird man sich nicht wundern sie blos in dem Radicalvermogen aller unser Erkenntniss, namlich der der transcendentalen Apperception in derjenigen Einheit zu sehen, um deren Willen allein sie Object aller moglichen Erfahrung, d. i. Natur heissen kann" (Kant, Deduction of the Categories, p. 576).

"After all, what do we know of this terrible 'matter' except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness" (Huxley, Lay Sermons, p. 142).

[12] Cf. the Sankhya Sara (i. 41, 42). The Vedantist objects that "since nothing exists except thought, neither does bondage, for it has no cause." The reply is, "Not thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external." The objector replies, "From the example of intuitive perception in dreams, we find this (your supposed evidence of objective reality) to exist even in the absence of objects." The rejoinder is, "Then if one does not exist, the other does not exist, and there is only a void;" "for," the commentator, Vijnana Bhikshu, adds, "if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist. It is intuition that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external does not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought cannot establish it (thought)."

To the five subtle principles are given the technical names of *sound, tangibleness* or *touch, odour, visibility* or *form,* and *taste.*

From these primary essences proceed the five gross elements (*mahabhuta*). These are: (1.) *ether* (*akasa*), from the subtle element called *sound*; this fills all space and envelopes all things; (2.) *air* (*vayu*), from the element *tangibleness;* (3.) *earth,* from the element *odour;* (4) *light* or *fire,* from the element *visibility;* and (5.) *water,* from the element called *taste.*

From Consciousness proceed also (6.) the five organs of sense (*indriya*),[13] which are eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; and (7.) the five organs of action; the voice, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the organs of generation. Lastly, it produces the *manas,*[14] which is the receptive and discriminating faculty. It receives and individualises the impressions made by outward objects on the senses. These it submits to Consciousness, by which an attribute of personality is given to them,and through which they pass on to the Intellect (*Buddhi*). By this last faculty the sense-perceptions are defined and represented in a full, distinct form. The soul beholds these presentations as objects are seen in a mirror, and thus has a knowledge of the external world.

(ii.) The next object of inquiry (the first in point of existence) is the primal source of these material existences, or the Unmanifested (*Avyakta*).[15] This is the primordial matter, from

[13] Kapila saw that consciousness was the base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions. "Soll Etwas uberhaupt etwas Reelles im Gegensatz gegen das blos Eingebildete bezeichnen, so mus das Ich wohl etwas Reelles sein, da es *Princip* aller Realitat ist" (Schelling, System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60).

"Both sensation and reflection are thus original states of consciousness, and exist only in so far as we are conscious of them. For example, I see and I am conscious that I see. These two assertions, logically distinct, are really one and inseparable. Sight is a state of consciousness, and I see only in so far as I am conscious of seeing" (Dean Mansel's Letters, Lectures, &c., p. 162).

[14] "There exists, latent or potential, in the sensory centres, something that may be called a faculty, which on the occasion of the appropriate impression, renders the sensation clear and definite; in other words, gives the interpretation" (Maudsley, p. 237). This is the *manas* of Kapila.

[15] "Here let us remind our readers of the argument by which we were led to conclude that the visible system (the *Vyakta* of Kapila) is not the whole universe,....and that there must be an invisible order of things

which all material things have emanated or have been evolved. It is eternal, universal, single, *i.e.,* without parts, invisible, and is inferred only by reasoning from present, actual existences, which must have a cause. It is not produced, but is productive ; having within itself the potentiality of all being, except soul. The Vedantists incorporated it in their system, making it the Brahmi, or productive energy, of Brahma.

(iii.) The soul, which is uncompounded and eternal, neither a product nor producing. The system of Kapila only recognises each individual soul, but the theistic Sankhya asserts the existence of a supreme soul, the Lord (*Iswara*) of all, the intelligent cause of the emanations from *Prakriti* (Nature).

These form the twenty-five principles, or categories of being, laid down in the Sankhya system. They are the base of nearly all the philosophy of India.

In the following distichts the methods by which all true knowledge is obtained are determined, according to the judgment of Kapila.

4. "Perception, inference, and fit testimony are the threefold (kinds of) accepted proof, because in them every mode of proof is fully contained. The complete determination or perfect knowledge (*siddhi*) of what is to be determined is by proof."[16]

5. "Perception is the application[17] (of the senses) to special objects of sense. Three kinds of inference are declared: it (an

(*Avyakta*), which will remain and possess energy when the present system has passed away....It is, moreover, very closely connected with the present system, inasmuch as this may be looked upon as having come into being through its means" (The Unseen Universe, p. 157; see also p. 158).

[16] Colebrooke's translation is, "It is from proof that *belief* of that which is to be proven results," and this version is supported by Wilson, on the ground that the Hindu commentators explain the word *siddhi* (accomplishment, perfect knowledge) by *pratiti,* "trust", "belief"; but in the Petersburg Dictionary this is explained as meaning: (1.) a drawing near (hinzutreten, nahen) ; (2.) a clear insight into a matter, a full knowledge, conviction (klare Einsicht in Etwas, volkommenes Verstandniss, Ueberzeugung). Lassen's translation is, "Nimirum demonstrandæ rei consummatio (oritur) e demonstratione", adding in his commentary, "Ultiman sententiam ita accipio ut dicatur id quod demonstrandum sit, magis minusve absoluta evidentia posse evinci secundum genus demonstrationis qua probetur". Proof, however, is here spoken of absolutely. There is no question of degree.

[17] *Adhyavasaya,* a word difficult of explanation. Colebrooke translates

inference or logical conclusion) is preceded by a *linga* (mark or sign=major premiss) and a *lingi* (the subject in which it inheres =minor premiss). Fit testimony is fit revelation (*sruti*)."

6. "The knowledge of formal or generic existence is by perception; of things beyond the senses by inference; that which cannot be determined by this (method) and cannot be perceived must be determined by fitting means."[18]

Perception results from the action of any of the organs of sense on its proper objects.

Inference (*anumana*) is teh process of reasoning. The conclusion that is drawn from it is *anumiti* (Tarka Sangraha, p. 30).

The Nyaya or Logical school admits four kinds of proof: (1.) *pratyaksha* (perception) ; (2.) *anumana* (inference) ; (3.) *upamana* (comparison or analogy); and (4.) *sabda* (verbal testimony). To these the Vedantic school adds *arthapatti* (presumption, an informal kind of inference; as, "Devadatta does not eat by day and yet is fat, it is presumed therefore that he eats by night;" and *abhava* (non-existence), a method of proof from an impossibility, or a *reductio ad absurdum,* as, "There can be no flowers in the sky."

By the latter part of Distich 4, Kapila limits all possible knowledge to his three methods of proof. He rejects all innate ideas, and all knowledge derived from pure consciousness. He does not admit any moral sense as inherent in the soul. This only knows or sees what *Buddhi* (intellect) presents to it. He adopts the axiom "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu;" and as neither sensation nor intellect can present the form of an eternal self-existent Author of all things, the doctrine of a Supreme Deity was not admitted into his philosophy. Kant has contended that the idea of God cannot be derived from reason, but only from the facts of our moral consciousness, which have no place in Kapila's system. Goodness or virtue is an attribute of *Buddhi,*

it by "ascertainment", Lassen by "intentio (sensuum)", St. Hilaire by "application". In the Amara Kosha it is glossed by *utsaha* (force, effort, application). The authors of the Petersburg Dictionary only quote from Hindu commentators some untranslated glosses, adding that some explain it as meaning "a strong will or effort".

[18] *Aptagamat,* from "revelation" (Colebrooke) ; "revelatione" (Lassen) ; "par une information legitime" (St. Hilaire).

which is only a form of matter. The soul has no concern with it. The only real evil is pain, and this can only be destroyed by an eternal separation of the soul from matter, which is obtained by knowledge, not by moral or religious virtue.

There is the same obscurity in the language of Distich 5 as in our use of the word "perception;" for *drishtam* (thing seen) properly denotes not the application of the eye to objects of sense, but the result of that process. The use of the term "application" is, however, strictly in accordance with the Hindu theory of the method of perception. The knowledge gained by the eye is not from rays of light proceeding from an object, but by a ray of light proceeding from the eye.

An inference, according to the Nyaya school, is "knowledge produced from a logical antecedent.[19] This consists in the knowledge of a general principle combined with the knowledge that the case in question is one to which it is applicable." In the Nyaya Sutra Vritti inference is said to be threefold: (1.) *"Prior,* that is, cause, characterised by or having that (cause); as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds; (2.) *posterior,* effect characterised by it; as inference of rain from the swelling of a river; *analogous* or *generic,* characterised as distinct from both effect and cause; as the inference of anything being a substance from its being earthly." This is reasoning *a priori,* from cause to effect; *a posteriori,* from effect to cause; and by *analogy*, or community of properties.

The terms *linga* (character or mark) and *lingi* (the subject of the *linga*) answer nearly to the major and minor premises of Western logicians. In the syllogigsm, commonly given as an example—

"Whatever smokes has fire;
This hill smokes;
Ergo, This hill has fire,"[20]

[19] Tarka Sangraha, p. 29. The word *paramarsa,* translated "logical antecedent" by Ballantyne, is translated by Wilson "observation", "experience"; prim. taking hold and then apprehension by the mind. In logic it means a fact or truth apprehended by observation. "For example, the knowledge that this hill is marked by smoke, which is always attended by fire, is a *paramarsa*".

[20] In the Tarka Sangraha (p. 32), the knowledge that this "mountain is characterised by smoke (the *linga*), which is invariably attended by fire",

the first proposition contains the *linga,* which here is smoke, and second the *lingi,* or that in which the *linga* inheres. By "revelation" is meant either the teaching of the Vedas or of other works supposed to have a similar or equal authority. Kapila, who was doubtless a Brahman, did not wholly reject the Vedas, but he treats them with little respect, and makes their authority subordinate to that of reason. His Vedantist commentators draw conclusions from this passage which are inconsistent with the first and second distichts, which express Kapila's fundamental principle.

By "formal or generic existence" in Distich 6 (*samanya*[21]) is meant all the related forms or genera of the material world. In the Tarka Sangraha (p. 56) it is thus explained: "Community (*samanya*) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in substance, quality, and action. It is of two kinds, the highest and what is lower. The highest is existence (*sattwa,* primal matter?); the lower is genus (*jati,* family or race), such as have the nature of substance (elementary substance), and the rest."[22] It is used in the latter sense in the passage which we are now considering.

Things beyond the senses are not only those which are too subtle for the organs of sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes.

Whatever lies beyond perceived or inferred existence can only be known by testimony.

is called a *linga paramarsa,* which means "such recognition of a sign as leads to inference".

[21] In the Sankhya Bhashya it is maintained that *samanya* here means "analogy", and that *drishtat* is put in apposition with *anumanat.* The passage must then be translated, "The knowledge of things beyond the senses is obtained by inference, *i.e.,* by the perception of analogy". Wilson and St. Hilaire adopt this view, but it is opposed by the following considerations:—(1.) The word *samanya* is not used by Hindu logicians to denote analogy, but a generic form of being; (2.) reasoning by analogy, or a perception of it, is not equivalent to the whole of the inferential process, but only a part of it. I adopt, therefore, the conclusions of Colebrooke and Lassen; but Colebrooke's translation of *samanya* by "sensible things", and Lassen's by "æqualitas", do not represent with sufficient exactness its meaning.

[22] *Dravyatwa,* having the nature of substance, from *dravya,* substance, which sometimes means elementary substance, as fire, earth, &c. See Burnouf, *s. v.*

7. "(This want of perception may be) from excessive distance, too great nearness, destruction of organs, inattention of the mind (*manas*), minuteness, concealment (by other objects), predominance (of other things), and by intermixture with like objects."

8. "From the subtlety (of nature), not from its non-existence, it is not apprehended (by the senses); it is apprehended (or perceived) by its effects. Intellect (*Buddhi*) and the rest (of the derived principles) are its effects, which have an unlike and a like[23] form to Prakriti (Nature)."

9. "Existing things (*sat*) are (proved to be) effects from the non-existence of (formal) being by the non-existence of cause; by the taking (by men) of a material cause (to produce anything); from the non-existence of universal production (by every cause); from the possible causality of an efficient agent (only); and from the nature of cause."

Kapila, or his expounder, contends in Distich 6, as the philosophers of the Eleatic school, against the assumption that the senses are the only sources of knowledge. Our senses are limited in their own nature, and their action is imperfect from many opposing circumstances. Hence many things exist which they cannot reveal, and they give imperfect information of things which lie within their range. The intellect (*Buddhi*) must arrange and present our sense-conceptions, that there may be a true cognition. In this way we rise from the knowledge of the manifold to the conception of the one, in which all things were contained and from which they have issued. Kapila, however, confines this oneness to primordial matter, *Prakriti*. He does not refer the existence of souls to one supreme spiritual Being, as the theistic school of Patanjali.[24] Herein he differs, too, from the Vedantists, who maintain that all things are the one supreme

[23] Lassen has in the text *swarupam* (having its own form), from the Sankhya Kaumudi, which must be referred to intellect (Mahat). All the MSS. but one have *sarupam* (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has "dissimile et simile".

[24] Fitz-Edward Hall says that "alike in both the Sankhyas there is acknowledgment of a being superior to the gods. He is made up of an immaterial part, *purusha*, or 'person', and of an *anta'karana* or 'internal organ', which is Prakriti (Nature)" (Introd. Sank. Sara, p. 2). This

Spirit; that the visible things of the outer world are only *maya* (illusion), the deceptive form with which the Invisible is veiled; and that, therefore, there is neither cause nor effect: all things inhere in, and indeed are, the One sole Existence.

But the world, as it exists, was to Kapila an effect. He proceeds in Distich 9 to prove this proposition by arguments which have received very different interpretations. Colebrooke translates the first part of the distich thus: "Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause), of what exits not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence." The doctrine of Kapila is indeed that cause and effect are so far identical that an effect is only a developed cause, but this part of his argument is contained in the sixth clause of the distich, where he argues from the nature of cause. The general argument or the main proposition to be proved is, that formal existence *is* an effect, implying a cause, not that effect exists antecedently in its cause. Wilson adopts Colebrooke's translation, and explains the passage as if in accordance with this view, but in reality he confounds two distinct ideas. "It is laid down," he says, "as a general principle that cause and effect are in all cases co-existent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation : *sat-karyam,* in the text, meaning existent effect prior to the exercise of the (efficient) cause; or, as the phrase also of the text, *asadakaranat,* is explained, 'If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected.' The expression *sat-karyam,* therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning 'existent effect,' not the effect of that which exists, and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of effects from the existence of cause, as Lassen has explained it: 'Quænam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia effects esse a *to onti.*

statement is not supported by anything in the Sank. Karika, and in the Sank. Pravachana it is expressly stated that "they (the Vedas) are not the work of Purusha, from the non-existence of a Purusha (purushasya-bhavat). Vijnana Bhikshu adds, "Supply, because we deny that there is a Lord" (v. 46). Some of the followers of this school asserted the existence of a personified sum of existence, called Hiranya-Garbha (Cowell, Note in Elph. India, p. 126); but Kapila did not recognise such a being. His Prakriti is impersonal matter.

Here the two propositions that effect exists *in* its cause, and that formal existence is an "existent effect", are confounded, and the last part of the sentence is not in harmony with the statement of the proposition as laid down in the beginning. The words *sat-karyam express* the proposition to be proved, which is that *sat,* manifest or formal existence, must be considered as wrought; or, in other words, is an effect implying an efficient cause. The phrase does not mean "an existent effect," but that what *is* formally existent is necessarily an effect. Causality is implied as an absolute condition of all formal being. *Asadakaranat* (literally from non-existence, non-cause) implies that there is an identity in the terms non-existence and non-cause, and that we cannot conceive of formal existence as uncaused: only the unformed *Prakriti* (Nature) is without a cause, having existed eternally.

Lassen translates the first argument thus: "E nulla non entis efficacitate. . . .colligitur illum effectum esse effectum *to ontos*. Wilson remarks, "It is here to be objected that the *ens* (*sat*) is the result, not the agent;" but Lassen here means by the (Gk.) *to on* not any simple or formal existence, but the unformed *Prakriti,* which is the true material cause of the whole series of existent things. The argument implies that the idea of cause is involved in the idea of formal existence, and that we can only conceive of any limited conditioned life as produced by something that preceded it, which is as truly existent as the effect, until we come to what is formless and unconditioned, i.e., *Prakriti* (Nature).

Cousin has entirely mistaken the meaning of Kapila's argument. He understands it as really denying the existence of cause, because cause and effect are, in the system of Kapila, of the same nature. "Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu'une cause apparente relativement a l'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effet par la meme raison, et toujours de meme, de maniere que tout est un enchainement necessaire d'effets sans cause veritable et independente." It is difficult to imagine how such a theory could be attributed to Kapila after reading any of the well-known expositions of his philosophy. Any link in the series of existent things may be a cause of that which follows and an effect of that which has

preceded it; and hence, as Kapila argues, we must admit a primal material cause, itself uncaused, from which all existent things have ultimately proceeded. He did not admit a supreme *spiritual* Being, an *Iswara* or Lord, either as the Author or Ruler of the visible world, but he argued for the existence of a primal *material* cause (*Prakriti*) as the necessary antecedent of every other existence.

St. Hilaire translates the clause as follows: "Ce qui prouve bien que l'effet provient de l'etre, c'est que le non-etre ne peut etre cause de quoi que ce soit;" but this makes Kapila *assume* that the existing world is an effect sprining from a cause, but his proposition is to prove that it *is* an effect, and that therefore there must have been a primary cause. His standpoint is existence in the manifold conditioned forms of things as they are, and that such forms must have had a primary cause, *i.e.*, that they are effects. The *nature* of cause forms the last clause of the distich. He rises finally at the end of the series, traced in an ascending line, at a true cause, which is, however, identified in kind with the effects which have issued from it.

Mill's definition of cause is more clearly expressed, but is insufficient: "It is an universal truth," he says, "that every fact which has a beginning has a cause," and "an invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every *fact in nature* [which Kapila calls *sat*] and some other fact which preceded it." So cause is defined, but more precisely, in the Tarka Sangraha: "That which invariably precedes an effect *that cannot else be* is a cause." It is this law of *succession* which Kapila declares to be invariable and necessary as to all the facts or formal existence in Nature.

In the second clause he appeals to the common observation of mankind that cause and effect mutually imply each other. If you wish to produce anything, you must use means for the accomplishment of your end. This cause must also bear a relation to the effect; it must be of the same nature, as stated in the third clause. If you would have cheese, you must use milk and not water; for one cause is not equal to the production of every effect. An efficient cause is also necessary for the production of

an effect as well as a material cause. A potter is necessary for the making of a jar; he is not competent to produce cloth.

The last argument of Kapila is "from the *nature* of cause," or, as Vachaspati explains it, "the identity of cause and effect." This would have been more properly placed at the beginning of the distich, for it shows what he meant by *cause,* which he explains as a material source from which an effect issues. As oil is extracted from sesamum seeds, we have in the latter the material cause or source of the oil which was in the seeds before it was extracted by pressure. His idea of cause and effect is of an antecedent form or substance, of which the effect is an emanation.* Effect is a developed cause and cause is an undeveloped effect; both are the same in substance, and hence, from the nature of cause, it involves the effect in itself, as that which is evolved implies the cause or material source from which it has been evolved. Now all formal life is a development, and implies that from which it has been developed. It seems, however, to be forgotten that the *efficient* cause, as the potter in making a jar, is something altogether different from the clay with which he works and the jar which he produces.

The nature of visible or developed things is then discussed, in contrast with the invisible or undeveloped source (*Avyakta*), which is Prakriti.

10. "That which is visible or developed has a cause; it is not eternal or universal; it is mobile (modifiable), multiform, dependent, attributive, conjunct, and subordinate. The undeveloped principle is the reverse."

The visible or developed universe contains the twenty-three principles (*tattwa,* existence, reality), which are emanations from *Prakriti* (Nature).

* H. G. Lewis goes further than Kapila, for he practically denies that there is any difference between cause and effect. "I have endeavoured to show that the supposed axiom of causes not being knowable when their effects are known is a fallacy and a misapprehension of the principle of causation; it is plausible only through the metaphysical postulate that the cause is something different from its effects." (Fort. Rev., April, 1876).

Kapila taught that the effect must be of the same *kind* as the cause, but he also taught that one may differ from the other in many ways. The potter (instrumental cause) and the clay (material cause) are not the same as the jar produced.

It is caused, for it proceeds from Prakriti; it is therefore not eternal as manifestation or form, but is eternal as being one with its source; for "destruction," says Kapila, "is a return to the producing cause."

It is not universal or pervading (*vyapi*): each of these principles (*tattwa*) is not found in every form.

It is mobile, admitting changes of position in different bodies.

It is multiform, existing in various forms of aggregation.

It is dependent or conditioned;[25] each of the grosser elements is dependent upon the more subtle, and these are dependent on consciousness, &c., up to Prakriti.

It is attributive or predicative (*lingam*[26]), *i.e.*, each substance has a characteristic sign or quality which may be predicated of it.

It is conjunct or conjunctible, for the elements combine with one another.

It is subordinate or governed, each being subordinate to the other in an ascending series, up to Buddhi (intellect).

Prakriti, however, is uncaused, eternal, universal, self-existing, and supreme.

11. "The manifested (*Vyakta*) has the three modes (*guna*). It is indiscriminating, objective, generic,[27] irrational,[28] and productive. So also is *Pradhana* (Nature). Soul in these respects, as in those (previously mentioned), is the reverse."

12. "The modes have a joyous, grievous, and stupefying nature. They serve for manifestation, activity, and restraint; they mutually subdue and support each other, produce each other, consort together, and take each other's condition."[29]

[25] *Asritam*.. Lassen translates it by "innixum;" Colebrooke by "supporting;" St. Hilaire by "accidentel." The Petersburg Dict. has "Halt und Schutz bei Jmd suchend," lit. "going to one" (for protection or support).

[26] *Lingam*. Colebrooke translates it "mergent," *i.e.*, subject to dissolution, after Gaudapada: but Wilson remarks that "pedicative" or "characteristic" would be a preferable translation. Lassen has "reciprocans," but he adds "dubiæ mihi est significationis." See the Tarka Sangraha, p. 38 (Ballantyne).

[27] *Samanyam*, translated by Lassen and Colebrooke "common."

[28] *Achetanam*, from *a*, neg. part, and *chit*, to perceive, to know.

[29] *Vrittayas*. Vachaspati interprets the word by *kriya* (act, operation), and connects it with each of the foregoing terms (Wilson, p. 51). The Sank. Bhashya interprets this part by "parasparam varttante" (are reci-

13. " 'Goodness' (*sattwa*) is considered as light (or subtle), and enlightening (or manifesting); 'passion' or 'foulness' as exciting and mobile; 'darkness' as heavy and enveloping (or obstructive, *varanaka*). Their action, for the gaining of an end, is like that of a lamp."[30]

These distichs introduce an element in the Sankhya philosophy which plays an important part in its physical and moral teaching. It is that of the three *gunas,* or qualities, as the word is generally translated. They are not qualities, however, but the constituent elements of Nature (*Prakriti*). "These three qualities," says Colebrooke, "are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." Nature, or primordial matter, is described in the system of Kapila as formed by the *gunas,* which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed there was no emanation into separate forms of matter. This state of rest was destroyed when Nature began to act, though unconciously, for the welfare of soul,[31] and this movement, as motion or activity in general, is due to the influence of that *guna,* or constituent of Nature, which is called "passion" (*rajas*). This theory seems to be contrary to a previous statement that Nature is one; but it is conceived as we apprehend light to be a simple colourless substance, though formed by a perfect union of the

procally present). St. Hilaire has "se suppleent reciproquement." *Vritti* means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each *guna* may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others, or be the same in effect.

[30] *Sattwa* (goodness or reality), *rajas* (passion), and *tamas* (darkness) are the usual names of the three *gunas.* In the preceding distich they are named from *"priti"* (joy or love), *apriti* (aversion), and *vishada* (stupefaction or dullness). The first is said to include rectitude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, and wisdom; the second produces hatred, violence, envy, abuse, and wickedness; and the last causes tardiness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, and ignorance (S. Chandrika, Wilson, p. 52).

[31] The governorship thereof (of soul over Nature) is from its proximity, as in the case of the gem" (Sank. Sara, i. 96). The interpretation is, "that as the gem (the load-stone) is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving (either to act or to be acted upon), so by the mere juxtaposition of the soul, Nature (Prakriti) is changed into the Great One (Buddhi, intellect)." We are not told how this proximity was caused, by which soul acted upon Nature, and Nature brought soul into bondage by connecting it with matter.

coloured rays, whose individuality is lost or undeveloped in that which we call light.

The *Gunas* are a mere hypothesis, invented to account for the manifest differences in the conditions of formal existences. There is evidently a subtle or spirtual element, one of passion or force, and something which is contrary to both, an element of dullness or insensibility, in at least all human beings,[32] and these are assumed by Kapila to indicate a primary difference in the constituent elements of Nature (*Prakriti*). The same idea seems to have presented itself to some of the earlier Greek philosophers, as Aristotle has described their doctrine.

These *gunas* are called by Kapila: (1.) *sattwa,* truth or goodness; (2.) *rajas,* properly passion, but sometimes interpreted as foulness; and (3.) *tamas,* darkness. Lassen translates them as (1.) essentia, (2.) impetus, (3.) caligo. The first, however, is not more an essence than the second or third. The second, "passion," is rather the caue of an impetus than the impetus itself, the moving force rather than the motion. The terms have, however, only a relative meaning. The *gunas*[33] are the constituents of Nature, which is only matter, and this is incapable of truth or goodness, according to our ideas of them. *Sattwa* means primarily existence or reality, the real essence of anything, and hence truth and also goodness or virtue; but as by the essence of a being we imply something more subtle than the gross form, the word is used to denote that constituent or formative element of Nature

[32] In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes : (1.) the spiritual, (2.) the vital, and (3.) the material (*Hylic*). This corresponds to the gunas of Kapila, and is probably an importation from India.

[33] In the notes to the Sankhya Karika which Lassen has given he explains the word guna thus : " Diversus sane est usus vocabuli, quum, veluti per Manum, de peculiari cujusvis elementi virtue dicatur. Atque est sane *guna* apud Sankyicos materiae innata *energeia* per tres gradus ascendens atque considens. Sunt tres materiae cum arcu vel lyra comparate tensiones, et reddi possit *guna* haud inepte per potentiam" (p. 30). This is not strictly correct. *Guna* means primarily a thread or cord, and Prakriti, or Nature, is as a string composed of three varying strands ; not properly energies, but constituent elements of different virtue. Kapila did not resolve matter into mere force, as some of our modern physicists. Force was only to him a condition of matter, or rather of one of its primary elements, i.e., of the *guna* called "passion."

which is lighter and more subtle than the other two. The second constituent is termed "passion" or "foulness," because it is the exciting element, and all action is, to the Hindu mind, an evil, or at least a defect. The perfect state is an inactive repose. The third, "darkness," is the grossest of the elements.

The *gunas* or modes are sometimes termed (1.) *Prakasa*, luminousness; this is prevalent in fire. (2.) *Pravritti,* activity; this predominates in air. (3.) *Moha,* delusion; this resides in earth, which, being heavy, is supposed to be formed by, and to represent, the gross, stupefying element.

Every kind of existence except soul is formed by the *gunas,* but in an infinite variety of conditions, as the different kinds of these elements are blended together in varying degrees.[34]

Kapila, or his disciple, Iswara Krishna, proceeds to define more fully the qualities which belong to every one of the twenty-three principles or forms of material existence.

Each is *indiscriminative, i.e.,* it has not the power of discerning the differences of things and deciding upon them. The *manas* ("mind") receives the sensations which are cause by the action of external things on the organs of sense; these it transmits to the consciousness (*ahankara*), which presents them to the intellect (*buddhi*). There the soul beholds them as in a mirror. The soul alone discriminates and uses them. Thus only is a true cognition formed.

It is *objective.* The only proper subject is the soul. All other things, from intellect to the grossest form of matter, lie without the soul and are its objects.

It is *generic* (*samanya*), *i.e.,* it produces generic or specific forms. Colebrooke translates the word "common," and Gaudapada says that it is so-called "from being the common possession of all, as a harlot." This is not true, as an exposition of Kapila's system, for *buddhi* is not common to all things. The meaning is,

[34] Even the gods are represented in the Vayu Purana as springing from the three *gunas.* "From Pradhana (Nature), when agitated, the quality of passion (*rajas*) arose, which was there a stimulating cause, as water is to seeds. When an inequality in the *gunas* arises, then they (the (gods) who preside over them are generated.... The *rajas* quality was born as Brahma ; the *tamas* (darkness) as Agni ; the *sattwa* (goodness) as Vishnu" (Muir, Sans. Texts, i. 75).

that each may form, with others, things that have common properties.

It is *irrational* (*achetana,* unthinking). Even "intellect" cannot think, for it is material. It is only a passive receptacle for arranged and individualised ideas. Cognition is a property of the soul alone.

It is *productive.* Intellect produces Consciousness, and this produces the five subtle elements, from which the grosser elements proceed.

Nature (*Prakriti*) is the same in these respects as each of its developments. Soul, however, is the opposite of Nature. It discriminates; it exists by and for itself alone; it knows, and is not productive.

In Distich 12 the gunas are classed as pleasant, unpleasant, and stupefying. "Goodness" serves for manifestation, for it is light and elastic; "passion" leads to activity, and "darkness" to restraint or inertness.

Each may ubdue or support the other; they are capable of producing each other, and have a mutual existence, *i.e.,* they pass into one another, or produce the effects of each in different conditions; as a good king rewards a good and punishes a bad subject, and clouds which may be heavy and inert may cause fertility and gladness. In their mutual co-operation they are compared to a lamp, whose light is produced by the application of flame to the wick and the oil.

14. "The absence of discrimination and the rest (the other conditions of material forms) are a conclusion from the three modes, and by the absence of the reverse of this (the modal existence). The Unmanifested (Nature) is also to be determined by the cause having the same qualities as the effect."

In Distich 8 it is affirmed that the productions (emanations) of Nature are in some respects like, and in others unlike, their original source. In Distich 10 the points of disagreement are mentioned, and the points of agreement in Distich 11. The first-named of the common properties is the presence of the three modes, and in Distichs 12 and 13 the nature of these modes is defined. As they affect the constitution of all Nature's produc-

tions, the faculty of discrimination cannot belong to any, for this does not belong to the modes. In like manner they are all, from intellect downward, objective, and have other properties of the modes. Also, as they are objective, *i.e.,* external to soul, they must be material.

The latter part of the first line of the distich—tadviparyaya-havat—is obscure. Colebrooke translates it, "and by the absence thereof in the reverse:" that is, as Vachaspati and others interpret it, in the soul; soul and matter being opposite in their nature. Gaudapada confines the passage to the undeveloped Nature (*avya-kta*) and the developed principles, *vyakta*), and explains it to mean that the absence of the reverse of these qualities in the developed establishes its absence in the undeveloped, for they are not contrary to each other. Vachaspati says, also, that "it may be understood as taking for its own two subjects, *vyakta* and *avyakta,* and asserting by the inverted proposition (negatively) that there is no reason (to the contrary) from one being exempt from the three modes."[35] Lassen connects "this" with "the three modes," and after examining other translations, interprets the passage thus: "Quæritur, quomodo interpreter hæc verba; vertenda unt Latine, quia non est contrarium hujus (*i.e.,* trium qualitatum). Refero autem ad Evolutum et Involutum, de quibus hic potissimum est sermo. Sensus ijitur ex mea opinione est: quia in eis (Involuto et Evoluto) non sunt proprietates tribus qualitatibus contrapositæ. Hae enim si essent, falsa esset enunciatio dist. 11 proposita." I adopt Lassen's explanation, as best suited to the grammar of the language and to the sequence of ideas, the 14th distich being thus linked to the preceding.

After arguing that the undeveloped (Prakriti or Nature), assuming it to exist, must be essentially the same as the developed (forms), five arguments are offered to prove the existence of Prakriti.

15. "From the finite nature of specific objects; from the homogeneous nature (of genera and species); from the active energy of evolution (the constant progressive development of finite

[35] Wilson, p. 59.

forms);[36] from the separateness of cause and effect; and from the undividedness (or real unity) of the whole universe."[37]

16. "(It is proved that) there is a primary cause, the Unmanifested (*Avyakta*), which acts (or develops itself) by the three modes; by blending and modification, like water, from the difference of the receptacle or seat of the modes as they are variously distributed."[38]

1. From the finite nature (*parimana,* measure) of specific objects. On this account they must have a cause, for otherwise they would have no limit in space or time. That which is conditioned must be dependent on something external to itself, and be limited by it.

2. From the common properties (*samanvaya*) in different things. Hence species and genera exist, from which we rise to the conception of one primary genus.

3. From the active or living energy (*sakti*) shown in production (emanation) of things. All things are in a state of progression, but their active, progressive life is not due, according to Kapila, to any "potentiality" which they possess in their separate nature.[39] Development implies a developing principle or energy, and this must be from an external source. The arrangement of parts can no more create a living energy than a machine can supply its own motive power.

4. From the separate existence of cause and effect. This is closely connected with the former argument. A living energy

[36] "Propter manifestationem per potestatem" (Lassen); "since effects exist through energy" (Colebrooke) ; "de l'activite de tout ce qui a puissance d'agir" (St. Hiliare.), lit. from the energetic action (*sakti*) of production or development (*pravritti*).

[37] Since there is a reunion of the universe" (Coleb.) ; "propter inseparabilitatem omnes formas induentis (Involuti)" (Lassen). *Vaiswarupa* is the entirety of formal existence.

[38] "Per diversitatem cujusvis, quam amplectitur qualitatis" (Lassen). "For different objects are diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively" (Coleb.). Wilson's suggested correction, "by modification, like water, according to the receptacle or subject of the qualities," is certainly correct. This is Gaudapada's explanation.

[39] As Lassen explains it : "Evolvuntur evoluta non per suam ipsorum facultatem, sed per potentiam quandam, quae est causa protestate ea evolvendi instructa" (p. 33).

is at work in production. This is the producing cause, and we can only conceive of cause and effect as different things, though each is enfolded in the other. The existing world of finite forms is an effect, and must therefore have a cause beyond itself.

5. From the inseparable unity of all (material) forms (*vaisvarupa*), or of the whole universe in its manifold forms. No part of Nature can exist independently of the rest. There is an unbroken chain or absolute continuity from the lowest to the highest. At the end of the existing *kalpa* (period of creation) they will all become one again. Gaudapada assumes this fact as a proof or illustration of the argument. Kapila, however, more logically, refers only to the actual connection of all the several parts of Nature as a proof that they have sprung from a common origin.

Some important questions are suggested by this theory of a primordial matter, from which all things, except soul, have emanated. How does this universal Nature, being one, produce different effects? How does it act at all, since it is not acted upon by anything external to itself? The answer of Kapila is, that it acts by virtue of its internal formation. It is composed of the three *gunas* or modes, and is inert when these are in equilibrium. It acts through a disturbance of this state. The modes are endowed with a power of motion,[40] like the atoms of Lucretius, and from their restless action combination may be effected in different proportions, as one or another may be predominant. This is the mixture or blending mentioned in Distich 16. It is also modified, as water or moisture, by different conditions, caused by the nature of its receptacle or seat. "As simple water coming from the clouds is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, in the nature of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel-karanja,[41] and wood-apple."

"Modified condition," says Vachaspati, "is the character of the three modes, which are never for a moment stationary." This

[40] Motion, however, is primarily due to the mode or constituent element of Nature (Prakriti), called "passion" or foulness."

[41] The *bel-karanja* is a leguminous plant, whose seed produces an oil used for the cure of scabies (Asiat. Res., iv. 310). A Sanskrit name of the plant is *chiravilwa*.

constant motion produces different effects by the ever-varying proportion of their action. In the gods, the quality of "goodness" predominates, and they are happy; in mankind, that of "passion" or "foulness," and they are miserable; in animals and lower substances, "darkness" prevails, and they are insensible or indifferent.

Kapila having endeavoured to prove the existence of Nature (*Prakriti*), now attempts to prove the existence of soul.

17. "Because an assemblage (of things) is for the sake of another,[42] because the opposite of the three modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist; because there must be a superintending power; because there must be a nature that enjoys; and because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation (from material contact),[43] therefore soul exists."

1. The first argument is from design; not of a designing *mind* from evidences of design, but objectively of another nature for which the arrangement (*samghata,* collocation) of material things is made. "In like manner,' says Gaudapada, "as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cotton, coverlet, and pillows, is for another's use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service; thence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose sake it was made: so this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use; or there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of intellect and the rest, has been produced.[44]

2. Because there must be something different from *Prakriti* (Nature) formed of the three modes; for this is the material source of pleasure or pain, and the sentient nature, which feels the pleasure or the pain, must be diverse from it.[45] This argument is based upon

[42] This is stated a little more fully in the Sankhya Pravachana: "Every assemblage, every combination, has always for its object another being" (i. 133).

[43] Colebrooke translates the last clause, "since there is a tendency to abstraction;" St. Hilaire by "parcequ'enfin il y a une activite qui tend a la liberation absolue des trois especes de douleurs;" Lassen has "ex actione propter abstractionis causam."

[44] Wilson, p. 66.

[45] Wilson, p. 67. The soul, however, in the Sankhya system, is not

our consciousness. We are conscious of a nature within us, which feels joy or woe; and this we infer is something different from matter, for we cannot conceive of mere matter as feeling or thinking.

3. There must be a superintending or directing force. "As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses," says Gaudapada, "so the soul guides the body." The idea of Kapila seems to be that the power of self-control cannot be predicated of matter, which must be directed and controlled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and this controlling power must be something external to matter and diverse from it. The soul, however, never acts. It only seems to act; and it is difficult to reconcile this part of the system with that which gives to the soul a controlling force. If the soul is a charioter, it must be an active agent.

4. "Because there must be a nature that enjoys,". This is substantially the same as the first proposition.[46] Gaudapada has practically joined them together by a common interpretation. The difference seems to be merely this: That the first refers to an arrangement of utility, and implies that it has been made for some one's use. The fourth indicates ownership or possession, and therefore a possessor, as an estate implies an owner. The idea that underlies both is expressed in the S. Tattwa Kaumudi: "Intellect and the rest are things to be enjoyed (*bhogya,* what is eaten, enjoyed, possessed) or perceived (*drisya*), and therefore these imply one that perceives."[47] Each has a separate function, which can only be brought into action by the influence of soul.

properly sentient, and the difficulty is thus explained in the S. Pravachana (vi. II) : "Though it (pain) is the property or function of something else, yet it is effected (in the soul) by non-distinction (of soul and matter)," or, as the passage is explained by Vijnana Bhikshu, "though the qualities pleasure, pain, &c., belong only to the *mind* [which is material], they exist in the shape of a *reflection* in it (the soul), through 'non-distinction' as the cause."

[46] The first or teleological argument appears to be of an universal kind. Every arrangement of material things is for a purpose, and therefore for one in whom that purpose is fulfilled ; or, in other words, the use implies an user. Some things, however, as intellect, are evidently, in their nature, an appanage ; they have no *raison d'etre* except as the adjuncts of another nature, whose ministers they are. They are intermediaries, implying the existence of the two extremes, the objective world and soul.

[47] S. Tattwa Kaumudi, Wilson, p. 67

5. It is assumed here that the yearning which all sometimes feel for a higher life than we can have in our present bodily state points to the possibility of gaining it. This pure isolation or abstraction (*kaivalya*) from matter cannot be obtained by any material means. These can only work by some kind of material contact, and this is the very condition that makes such a life impossible. The agent, therefore, which must set us free from matter must be something that is not of a material nature. It is knowledge, which the soul gains by its own powers, when brought into proximity to matter.

Kapila, or his expositor Iswara Krishna, proceeds to establish the plurality or separate existence of souls.

18. "From the separate allotment of birth, death, and the organs; from the diversity of occupations at the same time, and also from the different conditions (or modifications) of the three modes, it is proved that there is a plurality of souls."[48]

As birth is only the entrance of the soul into another body, and death the departure of the soul from it, then, it is argued, if soul were absolutely one (as the Vedantists teach), it would enter into bodies or leave them at the same time. It is not very clear why the organs of sense or of action must be alike in all if soul were absolutely one. The course of thought in the mind of Kapila was possibly this: As defects in the organs, such as blindness or deafness, are due to the actions of a previous life, and oneness of soul must produce an uniformity of conditions, such an effect happening to one must happen to all. But all actions are not alike, nor are they the same at the same time, as they

[48] Neither Hindu nor European commentators explain clearly the meaning of this distich ; they merely repeat it. There is, however, the difficulty that the soul is not affected by the three modes. How, then, can their various modifications prove the individuality of souls, in opposition to the Vedantist doctrine that all souls are only portions of the one, an infinitely extended monad ? Kapila's argument seems to be that every soul is accompanied by its linga, a subtle body formed of the finer principles of matter, in which lie the dispositions (*bhavas*) of the individual. Now the linga is variously affected by the three modes, and hence arise the different mental and moral conditions of persons, and by this difference each soul is separated from other souls. This, however, is very like saying that men are differentiated from each other, not by their self-consciousness, but by the clothes which they wear.

would be if all souls (and there is a directing force in the soul) were absolutely one. Men are differently affected, too, by the modes or constituent elements of Nature: one has more affinity to, or is more easily affected by, the mode called "goodness;" another by the mode called "passion;" and another by the "darkness" mode. But if all souls were absolutely one, each person would be the same in his mental and moral state. Each soul has, therefore, a distinct personality, for men are not the same in these respects. This line of argument makes the soul less passive than it is represented to be in other parts of the system, for a certain responsibility is given to it which is inconsistent with the idea of a perfect abstinence from all action.

In the Sankyha Sutras (i. 154), Kapila is represented as arguing that his doctrine is not different from that of the Vedas, because the latter are said to teach only a *generic* oneness of soul. The sutra is probably a late interpolation, due to some one who wished to reconcile the system of Kapila with that of the Vedantist school.[49] Kapila himself seems to have been too honest and too bold a thinker to make such an attempt. The teaching of the Vedanta system is that all souls are one, not because they belong to the same genus or class of being, but because they are portions of the One Spirit, who is indeed the All. Kapila thought that each soul is a separate ens or existence,[50] limited by its union with a body, though soul, in the abstract idea of it, seems to be unlimited. But this abstract soul is not the Supreme Spirit, the

[49] The Vedantist leaning of the Sank. Pravachana shows not only that Kapila was not the author of the work, but that it is later in time than the Sank. Karika.

[50] Cf. Sank. Pravachana (vi. 63), where it is said that the separate life of a soul (*jivatwa,* the property of living) is from a distinction as of race, i.e. by attendant qualities ; or, as Vijnana Bhikshu interprets the passage, "to be a living soul means the being possessed of the vital airs and this the character of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure soul (which is unconditioned)." There is some confusion here. In the system of Kapila the vital airs belong to the body and do not affect the soul. In the next Sutra all action is separated from the soul and from any superintending influence. "The accomplishment of works depends on the agent, self-consciousness not on a Lord (Iswara), from the absence of proof (that such a Lord exists)."

Iswara or Lord of the Pataniali system. If an absolute Supreme Spirit exists, he maintained (it seems) that such a nature lies outside the domain of philosophy; humanity being with him, as with Fichte and the Comtists, the highest point of philosophic research.

19. "And from that contrariety (of soul) it is concluded that the witnessing soul is isolated, neutral, perceptive, and inactive by nature."

20. "It is thus, from this union, that the unintelligent body (the *linga*)[51] appears to be intelligent, and from the activity of the modes the stranger (the soul) appears to be an agent."

21. "It is that the soul may be able to contemplate Nature, and to become entirely separated from it, that the union of both is made, as of the halt and the blind, and through that (union) the universe is formed."

The soul beholds as an eye-witness (*sakshin*), for insight or cognition does not belong to matter. "That which is irrational cannot observe, and that to which an object is apparent is a witness." It is *solitary* or perfectly distinct from matter, and therefore from the modifications which the modes produce. It is *neutral* (*madhyastha,* lit. standing between), "as a wandering ascetic is lonely and unconcerned while the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture."[52] It is *perceptive*. This appears to differ from the first quality in this, that as a witness the soul only observes, and then by seeing that which is presented to it by the *buddhi* (intellect), it perceives and understands the phenomena of the material world. It is still, however, passive or inert. All action, in the judgment of a Hindu, is inferior to a contemplative state, and the soul in its regal grandeur has no part in the inferior life of action. It directs as a sovereign, but it does not work. In the system of Kapila, all action, even mental effort or application, is due to the influence of the three modes, of which Nature

[51] Wilson says: "The term *linga* in the first line is explained to denote *mahat* [intellect] and the subtle products of *pradhana* [Nature]." This is a mistake. The *linga* does not denote them. This subtle vehicle of the soul is formed from the subtance of the three internal organs and the finer elements of matter (*tanmatra*).

[52] Gaudapada's Commentary.

(*Prakriti*) is formed, and the soul is not subject to their influence. It is, therefore, completely passive.[53].

In every form of earthly life the soul is united to its own peculiar vehicle or body, but is not blended with it; it is only in a state of juxtaposition, or rather it is enveloped by the body. By this is meant, not the gross material body, which perishes at each migration of the soul, but the *linga,* which is formed out of the subtler elements of Nature. This attends the soul until finally a complete separation from matter is obtained.

It is from the proximity of "intellect" (*buddhi*) to the soul that the former seems to think and the latter to act. "Thence" says the S. Chandrika, "that which is an effect of *pradhana* (Nature), the category, *buddhi,* though it is unintelligent, is as if it were intelligent: says, 'I know,' and is endowed with knowledge." But there is no true cognition until the soul has seen the individualised and complete sensations, now elaborated into form, in the *buddhi.* It is from this effect that the soul seems to act, the motive power of the "intellect" being in close approximation to it. It has, indeed, a kind of action in itself, so far as observation and the formation of thought are action, but it is not an agent upon anything external to itself. Kapila insists upon this distinction, which is essential to his system, from a strong conviction of the absolute and essential distinction of soul and matter. They are in their very nature subject and object, and can never coalesce. As "idea" and "thing" they are eternally separate, and their properties or functions can never be interchanged. The doctrine of Fichte—that material things exist, at least to us, only as a result of the laws of the inward subjective nature—is wholly contrary to that of Kapila. Both are absolute entities, having distinct functions, but it is only by the juxtaposition of the two that knowledge can be gained. This is a result of the synthesis of the discerning faculty and the thing to be discerned. Hence there are no innate ideas, and the soul, when freed from

[53] "To fools the spirit seems to be active, when the senses alone are really active ; just as the moon appears to move when the clouds only are passing" (Atma Bodha Prakasika, by Samkara-acharya, i. 19, quoted in Ind. Ant., May 1876).

the contact of matter, has neither knowledge nor self-consciousness. The soul can only see what *buddhi* (intellect) presents to its view, and it is of the essence of his system that "nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu." In making the soul absolutely dependent on the senses for its ideas; in refusing to admit that there is anything higher than the individual soul which may enlighten or act upon it, he laid the foundation for a philosophical atheism, or what is now called agnosticism. Like Fichte, in making the individual self, *i.e.,* the soul, , the highest form of knowable being, he rejected the idea of a supreme, personal Deity, as a truth determined by logical inference, though it is not certain that he absolutely denied it. We cannot know God, because he cannot be presented as an object to be seen in the *buddhi,* and the soul has no virtue or moral consciousness, for this is a property of our material nature. He seems to magnify philosophy, as an outcome of human reason, as some of our modern teachers, but in reality degrades it, both in its mental and moral aspects, by making the thinking faculty completely dependent on the sensations that come from material things for the whole of its knowledge, and even its self-consciousness.

Kapila teaches (Dist. 21) that the material universe was formed, or, in Hindu phrase, the various forms of matter were evolved, by the unconscious *Prakriti* (Nature), for the use of the soul, *i.e.,* that the soul may gain a knowledge of material things, and thus by contrast know itself as the means of a final liberation from matter. This is illustrated by the well-known tale of a blind man meeting in a forest with one that was lame, when, agreeing to help each other, the blind man bore the lame on his shoulders, and by the union of their powers they were able to escape from the *jungle.* Nature (*Prakriti*) is the blind man, for escape the jungle. Nature (*Prakriti*) is the blind man, for it cannot see, and the soul is the lame one, for it cannot act.

The order in which the various emanations from Nature were produced is then set forth—

22. "From Nature (*Prakriti*) issues the great principle (*mahat,* intellect), and from this the Ego or Consciousness; from

this (consciousness) the whole assemblage of the sixteen (principles or entities), and from five of the sixteen the five gross elements."

The categories, or separate entities, of the Sankhya system have been assumed in the previous distichs, and their mutual relations determined. Here the order of their production is given. This has been stated elsewhere, but it may be useful to present it in a tabular form.

1. Prakriti or primordial matter, the *ele* of the Greek philosophy.
2. Mahat or Buddhi (intellect).
3. Ahankara, the Ego or Consciousness.
4. The five subtle elements (Tanmatra).
5. The five grosser elements, ether, air, earth, light or fire, and water.
6. The five senses.
7. The five organs of action.
8. The Manas (mind), which is the first of the internal organs, receiving the impression made upon the senses. It ought to be numbered with *buddhi* and *ahankara,* making with them the three internal organs.
9. The soul (*Atman, Purusha*), which is totally distinct from Prakriti (Nature), forms, with Nature and its emanations, the twenty-five *tattwas* (categories) in the Sankhya philosophy. He who understands them thoroughly has attained to the highest state of man in the present life, and in laying aside the body in death shall know birth no more; he is for ever freed from any contact with matter, and therefore from pain. "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may enter, and whether he wear braided hair, or a topknot only, or be shaven, he is free; of this there is no doubt."[54]

23. "Intellect is the distinguishing principle (*adhyavasaya*). Virtue, knowledge, freedom from passion, and power denote it

[54] Quoted in Gaudapada's Comm. (Wilson, p. 79), The meaning is, whether he has the braided or matted hair worn by Siva and ascetics, or be a Brahman, or has the shaven head (munda) of a Buddhist.

when affected by (the mode) 'goodness;' when affected by 'darkness' it is the reverse of these."

The word by which *buddhi* (intellect) is defined or explained is unfortunately of doubtful meaning. In the Amara Kosha it is a synonym of *utsaha,* strenuous effort.[55] The Peters, Dict. interprets it by "fester wille," "fester bestreben." Lassen translates it by "intentio," and Colebrooke by "ascertainment." St. Hilaire writes, "L'intelligence, c'est la determination distincte des choses," and with this interpretation the comment of Gaudapada agrees.[56] "This is a jar, this is cloth; that which marks or designates thus is *buddhi.*" The word is, however, more commonly used in the sense of "determination," "resolve;" but this appears to be a secondary meaning, the primary being a defining or distinguishing act. "Intellect" (*buddhi*) is then, in the system of Kapila, the faculty or organ by which outward objects are presented to the view of the soul in their proper and definite form. Some of the commentators suppose that here is the seat of will, or that by *buddhi* we say, "This must be done." But this assignment is probably due to the modern sense of the word; for it does not appear that Kapila attributed volition to any form of matter, though as subtle as that of *buddhi.*

He assigns to it, however, other properties which are equally strange as attributes of matter. Having defined the soul as that which contemplates but never acts, he is obliged to assign every quality or state that is connected with our active life to *buddhi,* the first emanation of Prakriti (Nature), as its primary seat. When it is under the influence of that mode or constituent of Nature called "goodness," ia is (1.) virtue (*dharma*), (2.) knowledge (jnana,) (3.) absence of passion or passivity (*viraga*), and (4.) supernatural power (*aiswarya*). When affected by the mode called "darkness," it is then vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. The commentators, who are generally under a Vedan-

[55] It has this meaning in the Hitopadesa, "effort," "determined application" (see Voc. by Johnson).

[56] The same word used to denote *buddhi* in the S. Parv Bhashna, and is interpreted by Ballantyne as "judgment." "Intellect is judgment, and judgment, called also ascertainment, is its peculiar modification" (ii. 13).

tist influence, explain virtue (*dharma*) as including humanity, benevolence, acts of restraint (*yama*) and of obligation (*niyama*). Gaudapada explains acts of restraint as restraint of cruelty, falsehood, dishonesty, incontinence, and avarice; acts of obligation are purification, contentment, religious austerities, sacred study and divine worship; but he expressly refers this interpretation to the Patanjala, or theistic branch of the Sankhya School. Knowledge, according to the same commentator, is of two kinds, external and internal. The former includes knowledge of the Vedas and the six branches of study connected with them—recitation, ritual, grammar, interpretation of words, prosody, and astronomy; also of the Puranas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is the knowledge of Nature (*Prakrit*) and soul, or the discrimination that "This is Nature," the equipoised condition of the modes; and "this is Soul," devoid of modes pervading,[57] and intelligent. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is obtained; by internal knowledge, liberation, *i.e.*, from the bondage of matter.

Kapila, however, placed a knowledge of the Vedas at a very low point, if he did not discard it altogether. Religious austerities and divine worship found no place in his system. The soul of man is the highest existence which his philosophy contemplates, recognising, as Comtism, only the supremacy of humanity, but rising above Comte in admitting the soul to be its only true representative.

Dispassion is also of two kinds—one which is indifference to all external things, either on account of their defects, or the trouble of acquiring them, or their injuriousness and wrong; and another which seeks only to be delivered from matter accounted as "illusion,"[58] that the soul may be free.

[57] Gaudapada gives this attribute to the soul, the powers of pervāding (vyapi); but this is properly a Vedantist idea. Kapila attributes much supernatural power to the soul in certain states, but he does not assign the power of pervading matter as its constant attribute.

[58] This is Gaudapada's interpretation. "Illusion" (*indrajala*, Indra's net) means a kind of magic, probably at first a kind of marriage arising from the rays of the sun (Indra). Here, as elsewhere, there is a Vedantist colouring. Wilson renders it "witchcraft."

By "power" or "mastery" is meant (we are told) supernatural or magical power. A devotee who shall attain, by knowledge, to a complete abstraction from anything external to himself, can accomplish what he pleases: he may traverse all things by subtlety of Nature; may rise to colossal dimensions; may stand on the tops of the filaments of a flower; may rise to the solar sphere on a sunbeam, and may command the three worlds. Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be complied with by that which is the subject of his purpose; the elements themselves must conform to his designs. "The ordinary laws that govern material things," says Hemachandra, "cannot impede the movements of one who has attained to this etheralised state."

24. "Egoism is self-consciousness. From this proceeds a double creation (*sarga,* emanation), the series of the eleven (principles) and the five (subtle) elements."

25. "From consciousness modified (by 'goodness') proceed the eleven good principles;[59] from this origin[60] of being as 'darkness' come the subtle elements. Both emanations are caused by the 'foul' or 'active' mode."[61]

The term used in Distich 24 as the definition of the ego (*ahankara*) is *abhimana.* The ordinary meaning of this word is "pride."[62] As Vachaspati interprets it, "The pride or conceit

[59] In the Comm. on the S. Pravachana by Vijnana Bhikshu, *ekadasaka* is explained as "eleventh," *i.e.,* the eleventh organ, *manas,* which proceeds from consciousness when modified by goodness.

[60] *Bhutadi,* rightly translated by Lassen "elementorum generator," the elements being what we call "matter" in its subtler forms. St. Hilaire has, incorrectly, "element primitiff."

[61] *Taijasa,* having the nature of the *tejas,* or active mode.

[62] The ordinary sense of both words (*ahankara* and *abhimana*) is pride. The principle is therefore something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness. "It might be better expressed perhaps by *le moi,* as it adds to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self-property, the concentration of all objects and interests and feelings in the individual" (Wilson, p. 91). The meaning of pride is a secondary one. It is not contained in the philosophical use of the word, which expresses only the perception, not the explanation, of self; though very naturally this perception led to a sense of superiority over outward things. Lassen gives an explanation of *abhimana* from an Indian scholiast: "Abhimana est persuasio hominis in omnibus rebus semetipsum respici, omniaque ad se spectare" (p. 36).

of individuality, self-sufficiency, the notion that 'I do, I feel, I think, I alone preside, and have power over all that is perceived or known, and all these objects of sense for my use: there is no other Supreme, except this ego, I am., This pride, from its exclusive application, is egotism." We cannot suppose that Kapila meant to imply all this by the term *abhimana,* but probably he did mean by it that egoism is not merely a consciousness of our individual life, but that which forms the relation we bear to the outer world.

The eleven principles are the organs or faculties of sense and action, together with the *manas.* For the five subtle elements see elsewhere.

The physical substratum of consciousness is affected by the modes, as every other emanation of Prakriti. From the influence of "goodness," it produces the ten organs and the *manas* which are called "good" because of their utility; but it is only when affected by that mode or constituent of Nature called "darkness"[63] that it produces inanimate matter. The element called "passion," which is here described as ardent or glowing (*taijasa*), must co-operate in the production of all, because it is the exciting mode.

The Egoism of Kapila has a threefold name, according to the various actions of the modes. When the mode called "goodness" affects it, and it produces the eleven good principles—the ten organs and the *manas*—it is then called modified (*vaikrita*) Consciousness. When it is under the influence of the mode "darkness" and produces inanimate matter, it is then called

[63] A real darkness is assumed in a splendid hymn of the Rig-Veda (x. 129)—

"Nor aught nor naught existed; yon bright sky
Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above.
The only One breathed breathless in itself;
Other than it there nothing since has been.
Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled
In gloom profound, an ocean without light."

Max Muller's translation.

In the old Greek cosmogonies, Erebus or Night was the primordial state from which all things arose.

bhutadi, source of elemental being. The influence of the mode called "passion" excites the others to action, for the giving of activity or impetus is its especial office. The three modes therefore act upon, or rather within, egoism or consciousness (for this, as a part of Prakriti, or an emanation of it, is itself formed of the modes), and their various action has the effect of producing different results; the first and second modes in union causing the first issue, and the second and third in their joint action the inferior class of existence.

26. "The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin[64] are termed the organs of intellect (*buddhi*); the voice, the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion and generation are called the organs of action."

27. "The *manas* (mind) in this respect has the nature of both (classes). It is formative (or determinative), and a sense-organ from having cognate functions (with the other organs). It is multifarious from the specific modifications of the modes and the diversity of external things."[65]

28. "The function of the five (senses), with regard to sound, and other (sense-objects), is that of observation only. Speech, handling, walking, excretion, and generation are the functions of the five (organs)."

The eye, the ear, &c., are organs of the intellect (*buddhi*), because they receive sensations which are transmitted through the *manas* to the intellect. In this division the tongue is considered only as the seat of the sensation of taste. The other organs are

[64] Gaudapada, whom Wilson follows, has *sparsanaka,* that which touches or has contact; the skin, as a sensitive organ. The MSS., however, have *twach, the skin,* and this is Lassen's reading.

[65] Colebrooke adopts the reading *bahyabhedascha* and translates the passage : "They (the organs) are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities." Following the explanation of Vachaspati and Gaudapada, Lassen has *bahyabhedachcha* (*bhedat*) and translates the line thus : "Multifidum est (the *manas*) propter diversam per qualitates mutationem et propter divisionem per res externas." The MSS. are equally divided as to the reading. As the distich is devoted to an explanation of tht *manas,* I prefer, of the two, Lassen's interpretation and the reading on which it is founded, but have given a slightly different version.

those of action. The organisation by which speech is produced is classed under this head, and the power or faculty of speech is evidently referred to mere sensation, as handling and walking. Probably Kapila meant to imply that language, at least in its primary form, only expresses what Locke calls "sensible" ideas; *i.e.*, ideas of material things formed by the senses. The action of mind upon language he does not allude to, and as the soul, in the system of Kapila, can only contemplate, it does not appear how language has passed from the expression of material objects to an abstract or spiritual meaning.

The *manas* belongs to both classes. It is both an organ of the intellect and an instrument of action. The word by which its proper function is defined (*sankalpaka*) is explained in an uncertain manner by the Hindu commentators. It is compounded of *sam* (Lat.=*cum*) and *kalpa,* "form," from *klip,* to dispose, to prepare. It may be translated as "formative" or "plastic;" the faculty of the *manas* being to collect together and arrange in an idealised form the manifold impressions of the senses.[66] It is the *sensorium commune* in the system of Kapila. The Latin *mens* and our *mind* correspond to it in origin but not in meaning. In our Western philosophy, mind is usually considered as an expression for the rational faculties of the soul, and as opposed to matter; but in the view of Kapila, it is not a part of the soul, but is itself a form of matter from a material source (*Prakriti*). Is functions are thus explained by Vachaspati: "It gives form

[66] Celebrooke renders the passage thus : "It (the *manas*) ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the rest ;" but the *manas* never ponders ; it is an unconscious agent, whose office is merely to transmit our sense-impressions, when collected and united, through consciousness to the intellect (*buddhi*). It is an organ, not from being cognate merely with the other organs in its origin, but from having cognate duties or functions (*sadharma*) to fulfil. Lassen translates thus : "Geminæ indolis inter hosce sensus est animus (*manas*), et imaginans est." St. Hilaire : "Le cœur (*manas*) est a la fois . . . et un organe d'action et an organ d'intelligence : sa fonction est de reunir." The Hindu commentators seem to have been perplexed by the secondary meaning of *sankalpa,* "design," in its twofold sense of a "formed plan" or "project" and "resolve." Hence, too, they have assigned the faculty of will to the *manas,* which in Kapila's system is unconscious and subordinate.

in a collective manner to that which is perceived by an organ of sense, and says 'This is a thing;' 'This is compounded and that is not so,' and it discriminates or defines (a thing) by its specific or unspecific nature." The *manas* then is the first agent between the outer world and the soul, collecting and shaping the scattered, indefinite sensations of the different organs of sense. It belongs, however, to that mode or constituent element of Nature (*Prakriti*) which is called "goodness." It is, therefore, not dull, inanimate matter, for this proceeds from the mode called "darkness," but matter of a subtle, elastic, animate nature.

The multifariousness mentioned in Distich 27, is often understood to refer to the diversified natures of the ten *organs*. It is so applied by Colebrooke and Wilson after Gaudapada. But the distich is evidently devoted to a description of the *manas*, and the multiform action is assigned in the Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya more correctly to this organ alone, on which it is imposed by the varying actions of the modes and the variety of external things: "as the same individual assumes different characters according to the influence of his associations, becoming a lover with his beloved, a sage with sages, and a different person with others; so mind (*manas*) becomes various from its connection with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, and being diversified by the modification of the function of sight and the rest of the organs." If, then, the *manas* is not in action, the sensation received from an object is lost, or, in the language of Locke, "perception is only when the mind receives the impression." It is thus that the *manas* is both an organ of perception and action; for it receives an impression from the senses and then actively forms this impression, which before "was only as the knowledge of a child or a dumb man," into a definite form according to its properties or its species.

The function of the five organs of the intellect is that of observation only (*alochana,* seeing, observing). This cannot be applied literally to all the senses. The meaning appears to be that each organ acts passively in receiving only the sensations which affect it, as the eye receives impres-

sions of form and colour. In the Sankhya Pravachana it is said that the senses are the instruments of the soul. It is through the action of the *manas* and *buddhi* that the impressions made on the senses become real perceptions, if such a term can be applied to the action of unconscious matter.

29. "The function (or action) of the three (internal organs) is the distinguishing mark (specific nature[67]) of each, and it is not common (to the three). The common (combined) function of these organs is (the production of) the five vital airs, breathing and the rest."

30. "The function (or action) of the four (the internal organs and an organ of sense) is declared to be either instantaneous or consecutive with regard to visible objects; the function of the three (internal organs) with regard to an invisible object is preceded by that of the fourth."[68]

In Distich 29 the distinct individuality of the three internal organs is affirmed, *i.e.*, their functions in the formation of ideas are interchanged; but they have a common physiological function assigned to them, and that is the maintenance of the five vital "airs."[69] The word employed here (*vayu*, air or wind) does not mean the elemental air, but a subtle inward force or action, necessary to vitality and independent of sensation. According to Gaudapada they are—

1. *Prana*, breath, the ordinary inspiration and expiration.
2. *Apana*, downward breath, the air or vital force acting in the lower parts of the body.
3. *Samana*, collective breath; "so named from conducting equally the food, &c., through the body."
4. *Udana*, ascending breath, the vital force that causes the

[67] *Swalakshanyam*, "specifische unterchiedenheit" (Petersburg Dict.).

[68] *Tatpurvika vrittih*, not, as Wilson translates it, "their prior function," but the function of the three (internal organs) is preceded by that (the action of a sense-organ).

[69] The maintenance of the five vital airs is attributed by Gaudapada to all the organs, by the Hindu commentators generally to the three internal organs exclusively. Vijnana Bhikhsu, in his commentary on the Sankhya Pravachana, expressly limits the production and continuance of the vital airs to the three internal organs (ii. 31).

pulsations of the arteries in the upper portions of the body from the navel to the head.

5. *Vyana,* separate breath, "by which internal division and diffusion through the body are effected."[70] This is not very intelligible, but as *vyana* is connected in the S. Tattwa Kaumudi with the skin, the subtle nerve-force by which sensibility is given to the skin or outer surface of the body is probably meant. It is also connected with the circulation of the blood along the surface, the great arteries being under the action of *udana.*[71]

In the absence of a precise definition of these "airs," a variety of fanciful explanations is furnished by Indian commentators. It is evident that they denote some subtle force which cause respiration, excretion, digestion, the circulation of the blood, and the sensibility of the skin—an unsatisfactory kind of physiology; but here is the first germ of the science, and the "airs" of Kapila are as scientific as the "vapours" which in the opinion of our forefathers caused melancholy and other diseases. They indicate a dim perception of what we call "nerve-force," something more subtle than the elements of inanimate matter; for it is caused by the action of the internal organs, which are due to the agency of the mode called "goodness," *i.e.,* matter of an etherealised and animate kind.

The action of the internal organs and sensation may be either instantaneous, like a flash of lightning, or gradual; "as," says Gaudapada, "a person going along a road sees an object at a distance, and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man; he then observes some characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there, and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding (*buddhi*) discriminates that it is a

[70] Gaudapada, Wilson, p. 105.

[71] In the Atma-bodha (knowledge of the soul), a Vedic poem assigned to the great commentator Sankaracharya, the soul is said to be enwrapped "in five investing sheaths or coverings" (*kosha,* cf. Fr. *cosse;* Ir. Gael. *coch-al,* a pod or husk). The third of these is called *pranamaya, i.e..,* "the sheath composed of breath, and the other vital airs associated with the organs of action" (Indian Wisdom, p. 123).

post;[72] and then egotism interposes for the sake of certainty, as "Verily (or I am certain) it is a post." In this way the functions of intellect, egotism, mind (*manas*), and the eye are (successively) fulfilled. The doctrine of the Vaiseshikas was that, in all cases, the formation of ideas is a gradual process.

This observation will apply to objects that are within the range of the senses at a given time. If the object be not present, then the reproduction of an idea is dependent on memory, for which a previous sensation is necessary. Memory is therefore a revived sensation; it is assumed that this has been, by some means, unconsciously retained.

Kapila seems to teach herein that "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu;" but not wholly so. He also would add, "Nisi intellectus ipse." The soul has a distinct faculty, which belongs to its own nature and is independent of the inner or outer organs. It sees and understands the forms of external things presented by its ministers, the internal organs. The soul alone is the seat of all real cognition; it alone knows and decides; it is therefore something more than a name for a generalisation of the nerve-processes of the brain, as some of our modern physiologists affirm "mind" to be.

31. "They (the internal organs) perform each his own separate function, which is caused to act by a mutual impulse. The advantage of the soul is their cause of action. An organ is not caused to act by any one."

The organs are defined and separate in thir functions, but act upon each other by a mutual impulse (*akuta*).[73] This

[72] This is Wilson's translation of the passage. I venture to translate it : "A doubt (or doubtful impression) having been formed by the *manas*, the intellect (*buddhi*) becomes discriminative." The *manas* does not reflect ; it only forms a *sankalpa*, or collected form of an object from the sensory impressions.

[73] Akuta is glossed in the Petersb. Lexicon by *absicht, antrieb*. Colebrooke's translation is "incited by mutual invitation." Lassen has "ad quam cietur unum *ratione* alterius." The meaning of "incitement to activity," mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *akuta*. "L'influence spontanee qu'ils exercent les uns sur les autres" (St. Hilarie). It is composed of *a*, to, towards, and *ku*, to cry. Gaudapada says that it

word generally implies a conscious purpose or resolve; but as the organs are not intelligent, the term is explained to mean an unconscious activity which is produced by the action of one organ upon another for the fulfilment of a design which is common to them all, and this is the final liberation of the soul from matter. For this purpose they act spontaneously but unconsciously, as the milk of a cow is formed unconsciously in the udder and yet serves to nourish the calf. They act, however, by an impulse derived from their nature, and cannot be directed by any external agent.

32. "Instrument (or organ) is of thirteen kinds, and has the property of seizing, retaining, and manifesting: the effect to be produced is of ten kinds, and is that which is to be seized, retained, or manifested."

33. "The internal organs are three; the external ten,[74] and these are to make known external objects to the three (internal organs). The external organs act only at the time present; the internal (or intermediate) at the three divisions of time."

Gaudapada refers the property of manifestation to the organs of the intellect only, and those of seizing and holding to the organs of action. Wilson adopts this view; but the author of the "Karika" appears to attribute these properties to all the organs alike. The organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifects it to the *manas;* this organ does the same to consciousness, and the latter to the intellect (*buddhi*), which, as a mirror, receives, retains, and reflects the impression, which has now become a definite ideal form, that the soul may see it. The ten external organs are the means of making external objects known to the internal, but they are limited in their action to the present time, the eye receiving

means *adarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in action).

Colebrooke and Wilson suppose that in this distich all the organs are referred to, but Gaudapada, more correctly, I think, connects it with the three internal organs only.

[74] St. Hilaire translates this part "l'exterieur [organe] est *simple,*" but for what reasons he does not say. The text is *dasadha vahyam*, "the external (set of organs) is in ten divisions."

an impression only from an object then present; but the internal organs have relation to time past, present, and future. This would seem to imply that they possess within themselves a power of volition, and that they are the seat of memory. The *manas* and the other internal organs appear to have impressions stamped, or (so to speak) photographed upon them; and these may be reproduced without reference to time. But Kapila has not attempted to determine where the power of willing resides, nor has he treated of memory or imagination as a distinct faculty. If the soul really directs, "as a charioteer directs a chariot," then it acts, though not as a mechanical force, and the faculty of volition must belong to it. But the action of the internal organs in reproducing a previous impression is not expressly referred to the soul, but rather to the organs themselves, which, though material, are thus endowed with a kind of volition.[75]

The results of the action of the organs are tenfold, according to the nature of the five organs of sensation and the five of action.

34. "Of these, the five intellectual organs (or organs of sensation) are the domain[76] of specific and non-specific objects.[77] Speech is connected with sound. The rest are connected with the five objects of sense."

35. "Since the intellect (*buddhi*), with the other internal

[75] In the Sankhya Pravachana (ii. 39-41) the *manas* is called the chief of the organs, and the possession of memory is assigned as a reason for the distinction. Money is therefore a quality or function of the *manas*. Gaudapada, however, attributes to each of the three internal organs the power of acting according to its own nature without reference to time, and to *buddhi* (intellect) is attributed the power of forming an idea not only of a present object, but of one past or future; so also consciousness and the *manas* can act, and memory, or imagination, in its complete form, must be a product of the three.

[76] *Vishaya*, gebiet, wirkungskreis (Peters. Dict.). The meaning is, the five intellectual organs have specific and non-specific objects as their province or domain. "Sensuum perficiendi inter hos quinumprovinciæsunt distincta atque indistincta" (Lassen).

[77] See Note A.

organs, allies itself[78] with all objects of sense, these three organs are the gatekeepers and the rest are gates."

36. "These having different characteristic (specific) differences from each other, and being variously affected by the modes, present the whole (of being[79]) in the 'intellect' (*buddhi*) for the sake of the soul, enlightening it, having a likeness to a lamp."

37. "As it is 'intellect' which accomplishes all the fruition of the soul, so also it is that which discriminates the ubtle difference between the chief principle (*Pradhana=Prakriti*) and the soul."

There is much uncertainty about the meaning of the "specific" and "non-specific" objects mentioned in Distich 34. Gaudapada, whose explanation is quoted by Wilson, affirms that specific objects are those which are perceived by men, and those which are non-specific are seen only by the gods. This is nothing more than a guess, which proves that the original meaning of the words had been lost. In the 38th distich those objects which have no specific marks are the subtle elements of matter, and Kapila's meaning appears to be (as St. Hilaire has suggested), that the organs of sensation (or of "intellect") have a relation to these as well as to the gross elements. For example, the gross element ether is produced from a subtle element called "sound." The doctrine of Kapila seems to be, that in hearing, the ear has a relation not only to the ether, but to the subtler principle that underlies it; a dim apprehension of the truth that hearing depends not only on some channel of communication between the ear and the source of sound, but on some modification of the material element through which the sound is conducted. This explanation is supported by the S. Tattwa Kaumudi, which identifies specific with corporeal objects, and non-specific with subtle,

[78] *Avagahate,* "adverts to (C.); "perlustrat" (L); "embrasse" (St. H.); lit. "dives down to," and thence, "has business with, apprehends."

[79] "Present to the intellect the soul's whole *purpose*" (Colebrooke and Gaudapada). "Universitatem genii causa menti tradunt" (Lassen). St. Hilaire has, after Colebrooke, "presentent a l'intelligence l'objet de l'ame." I prefer Lassen's version. The organs bring all things in a definite form before the soul, as a lamp reveals objects, that the soul may know both them and itself.

rudimental objects, the latter being seen only by holy men and gods. This clause Kapila would reject, for he set knowledge and philosophers above virtue and holy men, and is silent about the gods. He appears to have supposed that a high power of physical discernment is possible to those who are sufficiently enlightened by knowledge.

Speech has reference only to sound, *i.e.,* we can only hear it; but the remaining four organs of action may be connected with all the five kinds of sensation; "as in the combination of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be taken hold of by the hand."[80]

All the organs are affected by the modes or constituents of Nature; they are only modifications of these three kinds of matter. They may, therefore, cause pleasure, pain, and insensibility.

The succession of the agencies by which the soul is reached is thus stated by Vachaspati: "As the headmen of the village collect the taxes from the villagers and pay them to the governor of the district; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister, and the minister receives it for the use of the king; so the *manas* having received ideas from the external organs transfers them to consciousness, and consciousness delivers them to intellect (*buddhi*), the general superintendent, who takes charge of them for the use of the sovereign, soul."[81] The intellect is, therefore, the soul's chief officer, its direct agent, and presents all that it receives, as in a mirror, to the gaze of the soul; not for the purpose, however, of adding to its treasures, but simply to free it by knowledge from contact with matter.[82] It has thus the means of discriminating between matter and itself in order to discern its own higher nature. This knowledge does not lead to virtue or piety. Gaudapada says that it is gained only by those who prac-

[80] S. Tattwa Kaumudi, Wilson p. 115.

[81] Wilson, p. 117.

[82] The mental physiology of Kapila is imperfect. The "intellect" (*buddhi*) merely represents sensational ideas in a complete form to the gaze of the soul, and the soul never acts. It does not appear, therefore, how abstract ideas are formed, or by what means a course of reasoning can be carried on. The Vedantists add a fourth faculty called *chitta,* the thinking or reasoning faculty.

tise religious austerities; but here, as in other places, he misinterprets Kapila, to whom religion was neither a means nor an end. It has an inferior place in his system. Virtue and religion may do something, by causing the attainment of a happier birth, but by knowledge only can the soul attain to its final liberation.

38. "From these five subtle elements, which are non-specific, proceed the five gross elements (*bhutani*), which are called 'specific.' They are (in their nature) tranquil, violent, and stupefying."

The five gross elements and the five subtle elements which underline them have been explained elsewhere. The subtle elements are said to be non-specific. This is explained to mean that "they have only one quality or mode, which is not affected by change, and by which no feeling of pleasure, pain, or stupidity can be produced." But it belongs to the nature of any mode or constituent of Nature to produce some effect of this kind. Vijnana Bhikshu explains the term "non-spefic" by saying that "the subtle elements are not affected by the modes; that they have an unchanging nature; but the gross elements change in their nature and effects according to circumstances. Thus the wind is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeable to one that is old, and when tempestuous or loaded with coluds of sand or dust, it is stupefying." As the subtle elements never come into contact with the bodily organs, they cannot cause any sensations, of whatever kind, though the gods, and sometimes even sages, may perceive them and receive pleasure from them.[83] They must also be affected by the modes, for these form every development of Nature, as they are from Nature itself. We may best translate these terms by "diversified" and "non-diversified." The subtle elements have each only one nature and one effect. The gross elements may have various effects, and become changed in kind by commingling in various degrees.

[83] Lassen supposes that three kinds of gross elemental bodies are here defined, the subtle being only subtle relatively, or in comparison with uterine and other bodies or substances; but the *linga* is not formed of the gross elements ; it is a compound of the substance of the three internal organs and of the finer elements called *tanmatrani*. All are bodies or developed forms, but not of the same materials.

39. "Subtle (bodies), those which are born of father and mother, with the gross form of existence,[84] are the threefold species (of bodies). Of these, the subtle are permanent; those which are born of father and mother perish."

40. "The subtle (body) *linga,* formed primevally, unconfined, permanent, composed of 'intellect' and the rest, down to the subtle elements, migrates never enjoys, and is endowed with dispositions" (*bhavas*).

After dividing the elements into two classes—those which have no specific marks and those which have such marks—the Sankhya philosophy divides the latter into three divisions: (1.) Subtle bodies; (2.) those which are born of father and mother; and (3.) gross substance or inorganic matter. By the first is meant the subtle or rudimental body called *linga,* which forms a curious element in the Sankhya philosophy. It is a kind of "spiritual" body formed from "intellect" (*buddhi*), egoism, the *manas,* and the subtle elements. It always accompanies the soul as an outward covering or form in migrating to another body. It becomes "specific" by the aggregation of the subtle elements, which in themselves are "non-specific" or undiversified. Each *linga* is inseparably connected with its appropriate soul, whose minister it is, until it is no longer required. It has a separate existence from the body which is produced in the womb of the mother. The latter dies and has no more distinct existence, but the *linga* never dies; it migrates with the soul. It is endowed with a separate vitality of a subtle kind, but still material, for it is formed from elements which proceed from Prakriti, but not of the later or grosser development.[85] It is capable, therefore, of rising to the heaven of Indra or to other celestial abodes, though it may descend to the vilest human forms, or even to the bodies

[84] *Saha prabhutais. Prabhuta,* that which is brought into being, often used with an idea of multitude connected with it; "in grossem Maase vorhanden" (St. Peters. Lex.). Colebrooke has "together with the great elements;" Lassen, "crassa" simply. The reference is not to the gross elements, but to the substances formed from them.

[85] "Let us begin by supposing that we possess a frame, or the rudiments of a frame, connecting us with the invisible universal, which we may call the spiritual body." "Now, each thought that we think is accom-

of beasts and reptiles. Kapila does not appear to recognise the possibility of the soul existing independent of material conditions until it has been prepared for its solitary but perfect state by a knowledge of the nature of the outer world and its own higher nature.

The *linga* was created primevally, or with the first emanations of Nature (*Prakriti*). Its period is therefore indefinite.

It is unconfined, *i.e.,* it is not confined to one body ; it is capable of passing into any number of bodies or to any region.

It is permanent, continuing to be the attendant of the soul until the latter has attained by knowledge to a perfect liberation from all matter. The *linga* is then resolved into Nature again.

It does not enjoy or possess, for it is only the handmaid or minister of the true sovereign, the soul.

It is of a subtle nature, being formed from the primary emanations of Nature, "intellect (*buddhi*) and the rest." Hence it has dispositions or forms of being (*bhavas*), as virtue and other faculties or powers. As the S. Tattwa Kaumudi explains its nature, it is "through the influence of intellect (*buddhi*) that the whole of the subtle body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed by contact with a fragrant *champa* flower."[86]

41. "As a painting does not stand without a support or receptable,[87] nor a shadow without a stake, &c., so the *linga* does not exist unsupported, without specific elements."

panied by certain molecular motions and displacements in the brain, and part of these, let us allow, are in some way stored up in that organ so as to produce what may be termed our material or physical memory. Other parts of these motions are, however, communicated to the spiritual or invisible body, and are there stored up, forming a memory which may be made use of when that body is free to exercise its functions. "(The Unseen Universe, p. 159.) This "spiritual body" answers to the *linga,* which carries into another state of being the feeling and habits of a previous state.

[86] The *Bauhinia variegata* of Linnaeus. It is called *kovidara* in the Asiat. Res. (iv. 285) ; a leguminous plant; "flowers chiefly purplish and rose-coloured, fragrant."

[87] *Nirasrayam,* without a receptacle, *i.e.,* the *linga-sarira.* The support or receptacle for a picture seems to mean a frame in which it may be

42. "Formed for the sake of the soul, the *linga,* by the connection of means and their results, and by union with the predominant power of Nature, plays its part like a dramatic actor."

It is affirmed in Distich 41 that the *linga* cannot exist alone. It needs a support or receptacle, but what kind of support is not clearly defined. Gaudapada reads *aviseshairvina,* "without *unspecific* elements," *i.e.,* the subtle elements of material things (*tanmatra*). The useful reading is "without specific elements." *i.e.,* "without the grosser elements," as the word is usually translated, but here it means, I think, as in Distich 38, specific forms, which are usually of the gross elements. The *linga* alone cannot perform any functions ; it must be joined to or enveloped in the *linga-sarira* (linga-body,)[88] by which it acts. And this body, when deposited in the maternal womb, is connected with another body produced in the womb of the mother from gross elements.

This distinction between gross and subtle bodies runs through the whole of Hindu philosophy. It is transferred to other worlds. According to the Institutes of Manu, a subtle body envelops the

fixed; but Colebrooke translates the word by "ground," and the authors of the Peters. Dict. interpret the passage by "wie ein Bild ohne Unterlage" (s. v. *asraya*). Vijnana Bihkshu (Com. Sank. Pravachana iii. 9) makes the *linga* to be formed of seventeen principles or factors, the eleven organs, the five subtle elements of *buddhi* (intellect). Self-consciousness or egoism is included in the latter." He explains the support which *linga* requires to be that of the gross body.

[88] The *linga* and the *linga-sarira* (linga-body) are sometimes confounded; but the *linga* is a rudimental substance, sometimes compared to light, and the *linga-sarira* is its vehicle. "When a dead body is burnt by one who knows and can repeat these verses (Smarta-sutra, x. 18, 11, and x. 14, 7-11) properly, then it is certain the soul (invested with a kind of subtle body) rises along with the smoke to heaven" (Indian Wisdom, p. 206). Williams adds, "The eighth Sutra of chap. iv. states that a hole ought to be dug north-eastward of the Ahavaniya fire and strewn with the plants Avaka and Sipala; and the commentator adds that the soul of the dead man, invested with its vehicular subtle body (called *ativahika* and sometimes *adhishthasa,* and distinct from the *linga* or *sukshma,* being *angushtha-matra,* 'of the size of a thumb'), waits in this hole until the gross body is burnt, and then emerging, is carried with the smoke to heaven."

The Hindu commentators are much perplexed by the word "specific" being applied to the subtle body of the *linga.* There is, however, no real inconsistency in the language of Iswara Krishna. The subtle body which is the envelope of the *linga* is specific or diversified by being formed of diverse elements, though each element is unspecific. On this is based the

souls of the wicked, that they may suffer the torments of hell.[89]

This subtle body plays many parts as an actor, in order that the destinies of the soul may be fulfilled, either in successive forms of an united existence, or in a final deliverance from matter. Sometimes it dwells in noble, and at other times ignoble forms, according to the virtues or vices of a former life. These vicissitudes are undergone by the agency or a peculiar energy or attribute (*vibhuti*) of Nature, to whom here a presiding power is given. The *linga* is the receptacle of the soul, giving it a kind of attributive or conditioned nature by contact, and it bears the soul, which never acts, from one body to another. It forms the personality of each individual.

43. "Conditions or states of being are transcendental, natural, and modified. These (last) are virtue and the rest. They must be considered as including cause (lit. cause-receptacle), and those which belong to the uterine germ and the rest of the gross body as including (or belonging to) effect."[90]

44. 'By virtue an ascent to a higher region is obtained; by vice a descent into a lower. Deliverance is gained by knowledge, and bondage by the contrary."

45. "By the absence (or destruction) of passion there is dissolution of Nature (*Prakrit*)[91] or (the power of Nature is destroyed). Transmigration is from disorderly passion. By power we gain destruction of obstacles, and the reverse by the contrary."

personality of each individual, for these elements may be combined in various degrees.

[89] Manu, xii. 16. This body is said to be formed of the five gross elements (*matrani*), not '(nerves of) five sensations," as C. Haughton translates the word.

[90] Colebrooke's translation is, "Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument." The meaning of the distich is that there are conditions or states of being in every specific existence, but that they differ in their nature and their source.

[91] Lassen's translation is, "placiditate deletur potentia naturæ." The original is *vairagyat prakritilayah* (from the absence of passion is nature-dissolution). The Hindu commentators interpret the words to mean that by dispassion an absorption into Nature is gained, *i.e.*, of the subtle body

These conditions or states of being are either innate or constructive (modified). To the former class belong: (1.) The transcendental state (*sansiddhika*), obtained only by sages, or, as Gaudapada supposes, by the great sage Kapila ; (2.) that which is natural (*prakritika*), or the state at birth caused by virtue or vice in a previous existence. The constructive or modified condition (*vaikritika*) is gained by other means, as by knowledge obtained from a tutor.

The modified conditions are: (1.) Intellectual, as virtue and the rest, *i.e.* virtue, knowledge, absence of passion, power and their contraries. These conditions have the nature of cause or instrument, for they produce a higher or lower state in a subsequent life, or even final deliverance from matter. (2.) Other superadded conditions belong to the generated body and the progress from infancy to old age. These have only the nature of effect. They are due to external circumstances, and do not produce anything.

By virtue (*dharma*), as a cause, the soul and its subtle body, the *linga-sarira,* may rise to a higher state, either upon earth, or in one of the eight heavens, or supramundane abodes. These are:

1. The region of the Pisachas, who are genii of the lowest class.

2 and 3. The regions of the Rakshasas and the Yakshas, of a higher class.

as well as the gross, but that final deliverance is not hereby gained. So says Vijnana Bhikshu : "In the absence of knowledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature), when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from devotion to Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place; for it is declared, 'Through dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i.e., absorption into the cause, the end is not gained, because there is a rising again as in the case of one who has dived" (Comm. on Sank. Prav., Ballantyne, p. 92). This statement is made because it is a cardinal doctrine of the Sankhya philosophy that the final liberation of the soul from matter can only be gained by knowledge. It does not, however, recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature until the soul is entirely free ; and hence, notwithstanding the general consensus of Hindu commentators, I think Lassen's translation is correct, and that the meaning is, "By the destruction of passion the influence of the material world (*Prakrit*) is destroyed and tre soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." See Distich 67.

4. That of the Gandharvas, a kind of demigods, the musicians of the higher class of deities.

5. The heaven of Indra (the Sun).

6. That of Soma (the moon).

7. That of the Prajapatis, the abode of the Pitris, or early fathers of mankind, and of the Rishis (holy sages).

8. That of Brahma, the highest heaven.

If, however, the soul is degraded by vice, it may descend to the form of an animal, or it may dwell for a time in the lower regions. Virtue and vice, though not clearly defined, have therefore an influence on the soul's future state, but the final deliverance from matter, when the soul attains to an eternal state of isolated self-existence, can only be obtained by a knowledge of Soul as distinct from Matter. Bondage[92] is the union of the soul with matter, though the matter may be only the subtle body of the *linga,* and the place of abode may be the heaven of Brahma.

By attaining to a complete suppression of passion, it is possible to gain a perfect freedom from the dominion of Nature or the external world, an absolute loosening of the bonds by which the soul is bound to material conditions. The common Hindu interpretation of the passage is, that for a time all the elements which form any envelopment of the soul are absorbed into Nature (*Prakriti*), but they are re-formed again until the soul has gained the knowledge by which alone it can be finally liberated from matter.

Supernatural power may also be gained, and the matter, in all its varied forms, can offer no impediment to the move-

[92] The bondage that comes from ignorance, according to Vachaspati, has three degrees: (1) The bondage of the Materialists, who assume that matter is the whole of being; (2) of those who consider the soul to be one of the products of Nature (*Prakriti*) ; (3) of those who, not knowing the nature of the soul, practise moral and religious observances from the hope of gain. These errors confine the soul by an union with a bodily form for various periods. The state of the first is almost hopeless, but the period of bondage for the second class is said to be ten *manwantaras* or 3,084,480,000 years (Wilson, p. 145; St. Hilaire, p. 180). The time of this penance is not, however, quite so long. The *manwantara* is a period of 4,320,000 years.

ments of the spiritualised body, which is no longer subject to the laws of the material world ; but, on the other hand, there may be a contrary state, in which every obstacle may bar its course.

46. "This is an intellectual production (or evolved state) which is distinguished by the names of obstruction, incapacity, acquiescence (or contentment), and perfection, by the hostile influence (*vimarda,* destruction, ravage, hostile attack) of modal inequalities (or specific differences) the different kinds are fifty."

47. "There are five kinds of obstruction, and, from the imperfection of instruments or organs, twenty-eight of incapacity; acquiescence has nine divisions, and perfection eight."

48. "There are eight divisions of obscurity, and also of illusion; those of extreme illusion are ten ; those of gloom and utter darkness are eighteen in each case."

49. "The destructive injuries of the eleven senses, with those of the intellect (*buddhi*), are accounted as incapacity.' The seventeen (injuries) of the intellect are from the opposites of acquiescence and perfection."

50. "Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth; four internal, named from Nature, means, time, and fortune ; five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense."

The 46th and following distichs form the outline of a Hindu system for "the conduct of the human understanding ;" but as they stand, they are too indefinite to have any practical value, and the commentators are not agreed in all points as to the right meaning.

In the phrase "intellectual production" (*pratyaya sarga*), the first part represents *buddhi,* the faculty by which modified sensations are presented as ideas to the gaze of the soul. "By intellectual production," says Wilson, "are to be understood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, impassiveness, and power, or their contraries." It denotes rather new conditions or modifications of the intellect itself, which by

the varied action of the modes may be differently formed or modified.[93]

"Obstruction" is explained by Vachaspati as "ignorance;" by Gaudapada as "doubt." It is whatever is opposed to the soul's purpose of final liberation from contact with matter.

Incapacity (*asakti*) arises from the imperfection of the senses. Acquiescence or contentment (*tushti*) is a passive state of the intellect. Perfection (*siddhi*) means perfect knowledge, no completeness in moral virtue.

The fifty varieties of these states are defined in the following distichs.

The five kinds of obstruction, according to Gaudapada, are obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness, which are explained below. The school of Patanjali defines them as ignorance, self-love, love, hatred, and fear. The eight varieties of obscurity correspond, it is said, to the first eight forms of matter. A person may think, for instance, that the soul merges into Nature, intellect, consciousness, or the five rudimental elements, and each of these obscurities or errors obstructs the soul in its efforts for final liberation.

Illusion is defined to be the error which induces men to seek for the eight degrees of supernatural power. The soul is thus drawn aside from its proper aim.

Extreme illusion is the error of seeking happiness in sensual objects, and is interpreted as being tenfold, because gods and men may seek happiness in the pleasures of the senses, and thus there may be a double series of errors arising from the five senses. Thus say all the commentators; but more probably, as St. Hilaire has suggested, reference is here made to the five organs of sense and the five organs of action.

Gloom (*tamisra*) is interpreted 'hate," and the explanation is, that a man may hate the ten senses or organs, and the eight degreees of supernatural power. He may thus be as much disturbed and drawn away from his proper aim as by the influence of love. The highest state to which he can attain next to

[93] Lassen calls the results "mentis conditiones speciales," p. 46.

Nirvana is one of pure contemplation, in which nothing is hated or loved.

Utter darkness (*andhatamisra,* lit. the darkness of the blind) is terror. It may be fear of death in men, and in gods the fear of being expelled from heaven by the Asuras; in each case it is the loss of pleasure or power which is feared; and as their sources are eighteen in number,[94] there are so many varieties of "utter darkness."

The destructive injuries of the eleven organs, *i.e.,* of the organs of sense and action with the *manas,* are deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste and smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity. The injuries of the intellect are the inversed or evil forms of acquiescence, of which there are nine varieties, and of perfection, of which there are eight. These states of acquiescence are both internal and external. The internal kind is fourfold. A man may believe, for instance, that Nature does everything and will in time procure the liberation of the soul; he remains, therefore, passive. Or he may rest satisfied with the efficacy of some religious or ascetic observances, or in the idea that liberation will necessarily come in time, or by an accident of fortune.

The five external inversions of acquiescence are abstinence from the five kinds of sensuous pleasure, not from a right idea of their obstructive nature, but merely from a desire to avoid the trouble and anxiety which they may cause by the indulgence of them.

51. "The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (*uha*), word or oral instruction (*sabda*), study or reading (*adhyayana*), the suppression of the three kinds of pain, acquisition of friends and liberality (*dana*). The three fore-mentioned (conditions) are checks to perfection."

The fore-mentioned conditions are the several varieties of obstruction, incapacity, and acquiescence. They are all checks

[94] They are, according to Gaudapada, the eight sourcess of supernatural power and the ten objects of perception, or the five objects of sense, twice told, to gods and men. He explains "utter darkness" as profound grief such as might be felt by one who dies in the midst of all sensual delights.

or hindranes in the pursuit of perfect knowledge. Kapila now defines the eight methods or means of attaining it.

Vachaspati interprets the first source of perfect knowledge, "reasoning," to be "investigation of scriptural authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the scriptures;"[95] but this gloss is evidently due to the Vedantist views of the commentator. In placing reason as the first source of perfection, Kapila meant to ignore the Vedas, or to place them on a lower scale. Human reason is the highest power which his system acknowledges. It is sufficient to determine what is truth, or at least it is the supreme judge of truth and error, in all that can be known. But its capacity has no defined limits. Such questions as "What am I?" "Whence have I come?" "What is the true purpose of my existence and of all existence?" might be answered, he supposed, by the reason, if not alone, yet as paramount over all other means. But the knowledge gained by reason, though far above virtue, is not man's highest state: it is only a means to the final deliverance of the soul, which will then exist in a state wholly independent, without motion, or consciousness, or knowledge; a state of eternal calmness and repose.

Word (*sabda*) is receiving instruction from a teacher. The suppression of the three kinds of pain (see Distich I), forms one of the means of acquiring perfection by taking away an obstacle to the thought or meditation.

Intercourse with friends is sometimes limited to philosophical discussions with a teacher or fellow-student.

Liberality (*dana*) is explained as giving money or other offerings to a teacher or to religious devotees; a Brahmanic gloss. Vachaspati and Narayana, however, explain the word as meaning purity (*suddhi*), deriving it from the root *daip,*[96] to purify, and not from *da,* to give. St. Hilaire approves of this interpretation. Wilson does not reject it. It is, however, contrary both to sound philology and to all we know of Kapila's views of morality. It is due to Patanjali, the author or expounder of the

[95] Wilson, p. 158.

[96] This root seems to be coined for the occasion. I have not been able to find it in any dictionary, Indian or European.

theistic branch of the Sankhya school. He, however, defines purity to be "undisturbedness of discriminative knowledge through long-continued and uninterrupted practice of veneration." Kapila would have admitted the ultimate point in this definition, but he nowhere speaks of veneration as a means of gaining it, nor did he admit a Supreme Spirit as the object of veneration.

52. "Without dispositions or states of being there would be no *linga,* and without the *linga* no development or manifestation of conditions (dispositions); whence comes a double creation—one called personal (of the *linga*), and the other conditional (of the dispositions, *bhavas*)."

In Distichs 40 and 43 it is stated that the *linga* migrates, invested with dispositions, according to the conditions of the intellect (*buddhi*), but the effect of these conditions or states of a former being cannot be made manifest except in or by a bodily form, and hence the necessity of the *linga.*

The second clause is translated by Colebrooke and Wilson, "Without person there would be no pause (*nirvritti*) of dispositions." Wilson explains the passage in his comment on Gaudapada's exposition thus: This creation of the *linga* is not "indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but is equally necessary for their occasional cessation; thus virtue and vice and the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition; bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue."[97] But here there is no *cessation,* but production of intellectual conditions. Lassen's

[97] Wilson, having failed to perceive the meaning of the passage, has translated incorrectly, I think, the comment to Gaudapada: "Without person, without rudimental creation, there would be no pause of dispositions, from the indispensability of virtue and vice for the attainment of either subtle or gross body." I translate the passage thus: "Without the *linga,* which is formed of the finer elements (*tanmatrani*), there is no development of dispositions (*bhavas*), and there would be no beginning of virtue and the rest without a complete formation of subtle and gross body" (na sthulasukshmadehasadhyatwadharmaderanditwachcha). The soul *per se* knows nothing of virtue or vice. Each is possible only by its union with the subtle body the *linga,* and the grosser uterine body. On the other hand, but for the necessity of these conditions there could be no occasion for the *linga.*

translation of the passage is, 'Nec sine corpusculo conditionum manifestatio;" and in his notes he ramarks *"Nirvritti* est manifestatio, evolutio, originario vocabuli sensu," referring to Manu i. 31. The translation of the word in the Petersburg Lex. is "fertigwerden," "ausbildung." The meaning of the distich then becomes evident. There is a continual action and reaction of intellectual and personal states, the first causing the latter, and the latter giving manifestation to the former. There is therefore a constant double creation, the *bhavakhya* (or dispositional) and the *lingakya* (of the subtle body, *linga*).

Some commentators make the *linga* itself to be *buddhi* (intellect) and *bhavas* to be its conditions. The former interpretation is perferable, for the *linga,* though formed of the intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to "intellect."

53. "The divine class has eight varieties; the animal,[98] five. Mankind is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (*sarga,* emanation) of living things."

54. "In the higher world, the quality (or mode) called 'goodness' prevails; below, the creation abounds in 'darkness;' in the midst, 'foulness' or 'passion' abounds. Brahma and the rest (of the gods) and a stock form the limits."[99]

The gods are only a created order (*sarga,* emanation). The genii or superhuman beings, such as the Yakshas and Rakshasas,

[98] *Tairyagyonas,* "grovelling" (Colebrooke); "inhumana" (Lassen); "nes de la matrice" (St. Hilaire). The last is certainly wrong, for it would include mankind. The Petersburg Dict. translates it, "standing in relation to beasts" (zu den Thieren in Beziehung stehend), from *tiryaga* (beast) and *yoni* (womb).

[99] Colebrooke's translation is, "In the midst is the predominance of foulness, from Brahma to stock;" and Wilson translates Gaudapada's commentary thus: *"In the midst,* in man, *foulness predominates,* although goodness and darkness exist, and hence men for the most part suffer pain. Such is the world, *from Brahma to a stock,* from Brahma to immovable things, "In the midst" certainly means in tre earth, which is between heaven and the lower regions, and Brahma does not belong to it, but to the region "above." Gaudapada's comment is, "This, *i.e., from Brahma to a stock,* is equivalent to from Brahma to immovable (innimate) things." In the S. Pravachana (iii. 50) it is said, "In the midst" passion "abounds," *i.e.*, as Vijnana Bhiksru interprets the passage, "in the world of mortals."

are included in this class. For the eight grades up to Brahma, see elsewhere.

The low or grovelling class has five genera or divisions: (1.) domestic animals (*pasu*); (2). wild animals, such as deer (*mriga*) and the rest; (3.) birds; (4.) reptiles, including fishes (*sarisripa*); and (5.) fixed things (*sthavara*), vegetables and minerals.

Man stands alone between these two classes, forming an order by himself. The mode or quality of "goodness" is only, it must be remembered, a light, elastic, etherealised kind of matter, favourable to virtue, but not of a moral nature in itself. Some of the supposed superhuman beings are neither virtuous nor beneficent; on the contrary, they are often evil and malignant. Man is under the influence of the active mode, "passion," and therefore he is miserable. Animals and inanimate things are formed from the mode "darkness;" they are therefore stupid or insensate.

55. "There (in the world of men) the sentient (or intelligent) soul experiences pain arising from old age and death until the *linga* has ceased to be; wherefore pain is from the nature of the (*linga*)."

Here is the climax of the Sankhya philosophy, the liberation of the soul from every kind or form of matter, even that of its subtle vehicle the *linga*. It is from contact with matter that pain arises. The soul knows nothing of decay or pain in itself, but the *linga* is so closely connected with it that it becomes sensible of the imperfections and pains that belong to bodily conditions by this union.[100] But when at length, by full knowledge, the soul escapes from "the body of this death," it knows pain no more; the *linga* is then absorbed again in Nature (*Prakriti*). Kapila, however, does not say where the soul exists after its final severance from matter.

56. "Thus this (development of being), formed from

[100] "So long as we are entangled and oppressed by the body, we shall never arrive at the point which we aim at, namely, at truth. The body is a constant enemy to us. The necessity of providing for its wants and the diseases which fall upon it are constant interruptions. It fills us with desires, cravings, fears, delusions, follies" (Plato Phædo, c. 28).

Nature (*Prakriti*), from the great principle (*Buddhi,* intellect) down to specific beings, is for the deliverance of each individual soul. This action (*arambha,* effort) is for another, as if for itself (Nature)."

57. "As the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the development[101] of Nature causes the liberation of the soul."

58. "As people engage in acts that they make desires to cease, so does the undeveloped principle (*Prakriti*) for the liberation of the soul."

Kapila here maintains that a purpose or design may be formed and completed unconsciously, without a designing mind. He feels, however, the difficulty of connecting design with unintelligent matter, and adduces as an argument in his favour the fact that in the udder of a cow the milk by which the calf is nourished is secreted without the action of intelligence. This is a favourite illustration among his disciples, and is generally put forward as conclusive on the subject. But the question still remains, is this adaptation the work of an intelligent designer, or the result of blind chance, a fortuitous concourse of atoms only? Kapila does not enter upon an examination of this question. He is content to assume the non-existence of a designer, because the milk is produced, and there is no evidence of a designing mind in the course of its production. He does not ask if the arrangement of the several parts or functions for the attainment of this end were fortuitous or not. In India, however, as in other parts of the world, the idea of a design without an intelligent designer is held to be an impossible assumption. "Whether this (evolution)," says Vachaspati, "be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act thus without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs Nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct Nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of Nature, who is Iswara (Lord[102])." This is sound reasoning, but it was not adopted by

[101] *Pravritti* (flowing forth, emanation) is used in each line.
[102] Wilson, p. 168.

Kapila. He saw that there was an adaptation of means to an end in the supply of a suitable nourishment for the calf; but as nourishment for the calf; but as the cow supplies it without bringing an intelligent agency to bear upon the production, so Nature works in providing what is for the benefit of the soul. She is not acted upon by any external force or necessity, nor is she directed by a superior power, nor does she produce by the necessary action of some internal mechanism, but by a blind instinct, as men act to gratify some desire that rises within them without volition.

59. "As a dancer, having exhibted herself on the stage ceases to dance, so dose Nature (*Prakriti*) cease (to produce) when she has made herself manifest to soul."

60. "Generous Nature, endowed with modes, causes by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the benfit of Soul, which is devoid of modes, and makes no return."

61. "Nothing is more modest than Nature; that is my judgment. Saying 'I have been seen,' she does not expose herself again to the view of Soul."[103]

62. "Wherefore not any Soul is bound, or is liberated, or migrates. It is Nature, which has many receptacles (or bodily forms of being), which is bound, or is liberated, or migrates."

Beautiful as poetry, but not very philosophic, nor in strict harmony with other parts of the Sankhya philosophy. Kapila, or Iswara Krishna, forgets that Nature (*Prakriti*) has no personality, no power of volition, and no consciousness. But the instincts of the soul (if I may use the term) are often too strong for mere reason. Kapila, like others, discards the idea of unconscious matter when he breaks away from the meshes of his false logic, and Nature is endowed with all the qualities that belong to a thinking and self-conscious mind.

Nature is called generous, or not seeking return, because

[103] Lassen's translation of Distich 61 is this : "Procreatrix, pudibundæ instar puellæ, non iterum invisit presentiam Genii, dicens ne hilum quidem est ; hæc mihi nascitur persuasio, postquam sum conspecta." It is centainly wrong. The true reading is not *prakritih* which Lassen assumes, but *prakriteh*. Colebrooke's translation is: "Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than Nature." It is not, however, gentleness, but modesty, that is attributed to Nature, by which she withdraws from the gaze of the soul.

she acts for the benefit of Soul, which, having no modes, cannot act, and therefore can give nothing in return. She exhibits herself to Soul in the forms of gods, men, and animals, and by the properties of sensuous objects, and by showing thus to Soul its own separate nature, provides for its liberation from Matter. When this has been gained, the result is eternal. Soul is never again joined to Matter; and Nature, having shown herself once, retries from the scene, "as a modest matron who may be surprised in dishabille by a strange man, but takes good heed that another shall not behold her off her guard."[104]

It is not the soul, therefore, which is liberated or bound, or which migrates, *i.e.,* it is not liberated or bound in and by itself, nor does it migrate by any act of its own. It is the *linga* which migrates, &c.; the soul is merely passive. "These circumtances," says Vachaspati, "are ascribed to and affect Soul, as the superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are attributed to and relate to a king, though actually occurring to his generals; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not theirs." The distinction is more than this. Kapila has a lofty idea of the soul. It is incomparably superior to matter. All outward things minister to it, as the servants of a king minister to his desires. But the servants and the king are both of a Hindu type. The servants are mere slaves, without reflection or power of self-action; and the king dwells in solitary grandeur, shutting himself up in his palace, and refusing to share in the ordinary pursuits of mankind, from whom he is separate, living in aimless and unchanging inaction.

63. "Nature by herself binds herself by seven forms; she causes deliverance for the benefit of soul by one form.

The seven forms are virtue, passiveness, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. The one source of deliverance is knowledge, which when Nature has given, she has accomplished her object and retires.

64. "It is thus that by the study of principles (*tattwa*) the knowledge is obtained which is complete,[105] incontrovertible, and

[104]S. Tattawa Kaumudi, Wilson, p. 173.

[105] *Aparisesha,* which leaves nothing remaining, including everything in itself.

absolute,[106] by which it is said, 'I am not,' 'Nothing is mine,' and 'There is no ego.' "

The meaning of this distich has been variously understood. To Cousin it seems to teach "an absolute nihilism, the last fruit of scepticism ;" but this idea is contrary to the fundamental principles of the Sankhya philosophy. To Kapila the soul was the most real of all things—self-existent, never born, and never dying. It becomes, by knowledge of the doctrines of Kapila, wholly separate from matter, and this separation is the soul's highest achievement. This is distinctly expressed in the S. Pravachana: "By renunciation through study of principles (it is said), 'It is not thus; 'it is not thus,' " *i.e.* the soul is different from all the emanations of Prakriti. The Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya gives this interpretation: " 'Neither I am' denies the agency of soul; 'nor is aught mine' denies attachment (to any objects): 'nor do I exist' denies its appropriation (of faculties ;[107] or, as the Chandika explains the last clause, "By this, difference from egotism is expressed." We learn, then, by these testimonies, confirmed by other parts of the Sankhya system, that the phrase "I am not" (*nasmi*) denies only life in its ordinary form, existence of a moving, acting kind ; "naught is mine" implies that the soul has now no adjuncts to itself, it is wholly self-contained ; "nor is there an ego" affirms that the soul exists without consciousness or sense of personality. The final and supreme state of the soul is then an abstract, passionless, unconscious state, which is the nearest possible approach to the Buddhist idea of *Nirvana*,[108] which, in its full completeness, is simple annihilation. The last stage of the wise man, according to Buddhism, before absolute extinct of being is gained, is very nearly the final state of the soul in the system of Kapila. But the Sankhya doctrine maintains the continued existence of soul, though in a perfectly unconditioned and passive state, as an eternal entity.

65. "By this (knowledge), Soul, as a spectator, unmoved and at ease, beholds Nature, which has now reverted from the

[106] Kevala, abstract, the only one science.
[107] Wilson, p. 180.
[108] See Childers' Pali Dict., s. v. *Nirvana*.

seven forms (to its primitive state), because the capacity (or desire) of producing has now ceased."

66. "'It has been seen by me,' says the one, ceasing to regard ; 'I have been seen,' says the other, and ceases to act. In the (mere) conjunction of the two there is no motive for production."[109]

The soul having gained the supreme knowledge, beholds Nature as a spectator looks upon an actress. The seven forms are described elsewhere. There is no longer any occasion for virtue, or for any condition of ordinary life, because the soul has now become entirely independent of Nature. The latter has now also no capacity (*vasa*) of producing. In the language of Vachespati, "The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excitements to the activity of Nature: if they do not exist, Nature is not stimulated (to production). In the text, the term 'motive' implies that by which Nature is excited to creation (to evolve the existing world), which cannot be in the non-existence of the objects of Soul." Creation, or the development of Nature, does not arise from the union of Soul and Matter, as some other philosophers have taught, but solely from Nature acting to satisfy the needs or the desires of Soul.

All things, however, return to unconciousness. Consciousness, or the ego, is a development from *buddhi* (intellect), which proceeds directly from Nature (*Prakriti*) ; but in the consummation of all things this element retires within *buddhi,* and the latter is absorbed again into *Prakriti.* Soul and Matter continue to exist, but each in an isolated, independent state.

But if the liberation of the soul is gained by knowledge, how then does the soul remain connected with matter when the requisite knowledge has been obtained ? This inquiry is answered in the following distich:—

67. "By the attainment of complete knowledge, virtue and the rest have become no longer a real cause ;[110] yet a body

[109] St. Hilaire's translation is "Et bien que l'union de tous deux puisse subsister encore," &c. This is incorrect. Soul and matter can never be reunited, according to Kapila, when the soul has been liberated from it. An assertion or theory of others is here denied.

[110] Dist. 67. Lassen translates the first line thus: "Postquam consum-

continues to be held, as a potter's wheel continues to revolve from the force of the previous impulse."

68. "This separation from body being obtained, when Nature ceases to act because her purpose has been accomplished, then the soul obtains an abstraction from matter[111] which is both complete and eternal."

By perfect knowledge the soul is freed from the influence of virtue and the rest, which are the cause of bodily existence in a higher or lower form. But for a time their influence may be felt, as a wheel will continue to revolve after the impulse which caused it to move has ceased. There is no longer any need of the activities of Nature when knowledge has freed the soul from all material conditions, and all things connected with this activity, such as virtue or love, will be known no more. The soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed ; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever.

69. "This abstruse knowledge, which is for the benefit of the soul, wherein the origin,[112] production (or development)[113] and dissolution of beings are described, has been thoroughly expounded by the great *rishi* (Kapila)."

70. "This supreme purifying doctrine the sage compassionately imparted to Asuri ; Asuri taught it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively made known."

71. "Handed down by disciples in succession, it has been compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble-minded Iswara Krishna, having fully learned the demonstrated truth."

72. "The subjects treated in seventy distichs are those of the complete science, containing sixty topics excluding illustrative

matæ scientiæ acquisitione invenit genius nullum esse pietatis ceterarumque conditionum usum." The lit. translation is, "By the attainment of complete knowledge, virtue and the rest have become a name-cause (*namakarana*)," i.e., a cause only in name. Cf. *namayajna* (name-sacrifice), a false or hyprocritical sacrifice. Colebrooke has "Virtue and the rest become causeless," which is ambiguous. St. Hilaire, "La vertu et les autres facultes cessent aussitot d'etre des causes."

[111] *Kaivalya,* the state of complete abstraction or isolation from matter.

[112] *Sthiti* is here, I think, the German *dasein,* coming into formal being (see Peters. Dict. s.v.) ; prim. fixity, place.

[113] *Utpatti,* going forth.

tales, and omitting also controversial questions."

"Thus is completed the book of the Sankhya (philosophy), uttered by the venerable, great-minded, and divine Kapila."

"May prosperity attend it."

APPENDIX

NOTE A

On the Organs of The Soul in the System of Kapila

Distichs 22, 24, 26, 34.

The Intellect (*buddhi*), the first emanation of Nature (*Prakriti*), is an organ or instrument of the Soul, for by it all material things are brought within the view of the Soul, which is immaterial. From it Consciousness or Mind-stuff emanates, and from Consciousness, affected by the mode of Nature called "goodness," issue the eleven organs (*indriyani*), which are the Mind (*manas*), the five organs of sensation and the organs of action. From it also emanate the five subtle elements of matter when it is affected by the mode called "darkness," and from the subtle elements the grosser elements are evolved. The five organs of sensation are called "intellect-organs" (*buddhi-indriyani*), and in Distich 34 they are said to be the domain of specific and non-specific elements (as Lassen translates the passage), or to concern objects specific and unspecific (as Colebrooke translates it). The meaning is obscure, and, as usual, the Hindu commentators throw no light on the darkness. Gaudapada assumes that by non-specific objects are meant such as are apprehended by the gods. If so, they would have no place in the system of Kapila. His meaning may probably be ascertained by noting that he regards these organs as a direct emanation from Consciousness, affected by "goodness," and therefore as being more subtle productions than even the subtle elements of what are usually called material things or gross existences. But the eye, for instance, as an organ of sight belongs to this last class. It is formed entirely of gross matter. It seems then that Kapila meant by "intellect-organs something of a very different nature. The organ of sight is, in his theory, twofold: (1.) a subtle organisation in which the *faculty* of seeing dwells; and (2.) an instrument, the eye, which is formed of grosser elements. The faculty by which we see was connected by Kapila directly with Consciousness, and by it a sense-perception, which is defined by the *manas,* is gained. Without it the eye could no more see than in the case of a dead body. Sometimes the faculty and its instru-

ment are united in one expression. Hence, I think, we may explain Distich 34 as meaning that the "intellect-organs" are composed of non-specific substances, *i.e.,* of the more subtle or ethereal forms of matter in the faculty of seeing, and of specific or the grosser elements in the instrument, *i.e.,* the eye. This distinction seems to have partly suggested itself to the author of the "S. Tattwa Kaumudi," for he supposes that by "non-specific" are meant such objects as are too subtle in their nature to be seen by ordinary men. Whether Kapila meant farther to say that this finer element or organisation could be known through the *buddhi* to Soul, is an inquiry that we may lay aside as having no practical importance.

If this interpretation is correct, the theory of Kapila has some resemblance to the conclusions of modern science. "Sensation proper is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affection of its own organism." "Numerous facts prove demonstrably that a certain application and exercise of mind on one side is as necessary to the existence of sensation as the occurrence of a physical impulse on the other" (Morell, *Elements of Psychology* pp. 107, 108).

NOTE B

On the Meaning of *Sat* and *Asat*

There is a general misunderstanding of these terms as used in the philosophy of the Hindus, especially in the system of Kapila. *Sat* is supposed to mean existence *per se,* and *asat* is therefore represented as its logical opposite, or rather contradictory ; the negation of being, or non-extence. Thus John Mur writes: "These ideas of entity and nonentity seem to have been familiar to the Vedic poets, and we find it thus declared (R-V. x. 72, 2, 3), that in the beginning nonentity was the source of entity. 'In the earliest age of the gods entity sprang from nonentity ; in the first age of the gods entity sprang from nonentity [*asat*].' In the Atharva-Veda (x. 7, 10) it is said that 'both nonentity and entity exist within the god Skambha ;' and in v. 25 of the same hymn, 'Powerful indeed are those gods who sprang from nonentity. Men say that that nonentity is one, the highest member of Skambha.' The Taittiriya Upanishad also (p. 99) quotes a verse to the effect : 'This was at first nonentity. From that sprang

entity [*sat*].' " And in a note he adds: "This phrase is also applied to Agni in R.-V. x. 5, 7, where it is said that that god, being 'a thing both *asat*, non-existent (*i.e.*, unmanifested), and *sat*, existent (*i.e.*, in a latent state or in essence), in the highest heaven, in the creation of Daksha, and in the womb of Aditi, became in a former age the first-born of our ceremonial, and is both a bull and a cow' " (Progress of the Vedic Religion, *Journal A. S.*, 1865, p. 347). So also Max Muller writes: "Some of the ancient sages, after having arrived at the idea of Avyakrita, undeveloped, went even beyond, and instead of the *sat* or *to on* they postulated an *asat*, *to me on* as the beginning of all things. Thus we read in the Chandogya Upanishad, 'And some say in the beginning there was *asat* (not being) alone, without a second; and from this *asat* might the *sat* be born' " (Sans. Literature, p. 324). There is occasionally some confusion in the minds of Hindu writers, especially the later ones, about the meaning of *sat* and *asat*; but, with Kapila and his exponents, *sat* denotes the existence of things in the manifold forms of the external world, the *Daseyn* of Hegel, the *Natura naturata* of Spinoza, and *asat* is the opposite of this, or the formless Prakriti, the Mind-matter from which all formal existence has sprung. *Sat* corresponds in each separate form to the "being-this" of Hegel, and Kapila argues, as the German philosopher, that "by virtue of its predicate of merely being this, every something is a finite," and therefore it is an *effect*, because otherwise we could only conceive it as absolute being, and therefore unlimited. Soul was something different from both. So in the Satapatha Brahmana (x. 5, 3, 1) it is said, "In the beginning this universe was, as it were, and was not, as it were. Then it was only that mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the rishi, 'There was then neither nonentity (*asat*) nor entity (*sat*); for mind was, as it were, neither entity nor nonentity.' " The meaning is that mind is neither the primal matter (*Prakriti*) (which Kapila assumed to be the source of all formal existence), nor the sum of existing things. The Vedantists taught that this primal matter was the sakti, or productive energy of Brahma. So says Sankaracharya, "We (Vedantists) consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the Supreme Deity (Parameswara), and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential; for without it the creative action of the Supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since if he were destitute of his *sakti*, any activity on his part would be

inconceivable" (Comm. on the Brahma Sutras, Muir's *Sans. Texts,* iii. 164). The full development of the Vedantist doctrine made the external world to be only *maya,* illusion. There is really neither *sat* nor *asat,* but the Supreme Spirit is absolutely the All. Nature is only the projection of the One, or, as Hegel thought (for he was essentially a Vedantist), "the idea in its externality, in having fallen from itself into a without in time and space;" but this is only a manifestation of the Absolute. "The Absolute, the being-thinking [the ultimate synthesis of existence and thought, of object and subject] passes through the three periods, and manifests itself as idea in and for itself [thinking]; secondly, in its being otherwise, or in objectiveness and externality [nature]; thirdly, as the idea which from its externality has returned into itself [mind]" (Chalybaus, *Hist. of Spec. Phil, Eng.* ed., p. 362). As Morrell has expounded his views, and correctly, I may add, "With him God is not a *person,* but personality itself, *i.e.,* the universal personality which realises itself in every human consciousness as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind. . . God is with him the whole process of the thought,, combining in itself the objective movement as seen in Nature, with the subjective as seen in logic, and fully realising itself only in the universal spirit of humanity" (*Mod. Phil.,* ii. 189). Pure Vedantism ! though Hegel, if he were alive, would protest against such a statement. But Kapila was not a Vedantist. With him the aggregate of existing things and each separate existence (*sat*), and the formless Prakriti from which they issued (*asat*), were objectively real and eternally distinct from Soul, though both Soul and Prakriti are eternal and uncaused.

Muir, however, refers to the commentators on the Rig-Veda who explain *asat* as meaning "an undeveloped state," and adds that if we accept this statement there will be no contradiction. *Asat* does not mean simply an undeveloped state, but the state of pure or formless existence of the primal substance from which all forms have sprung. It is clear, however, that if *asat* means an undeveloped state, then *sat* must mean, not the essence of anything, but a developed state, the development of the existing world, as Kapila uses it. The writer of the Vedic hymn (R.-V. x. 57) meant to say that Agni was *asat,* but became *sat* in the birth (*janman*) of Daksha and in the womb of Aditi. It is clear, also, that Kapila, in this part of his system, incorporated an older theory, in which *asat* denoted at least the undeveloped state from which existing things have been developed. *Sat* was

the whole of existent things. In Rig-Veda, i. 96, 7, Agni is called *satas gopa,* the guardian of that which has a present being. There is also the germ of another part of his system in a hymn of this Veda (x. 129): "There was then neither *asat* nor *sat.*" There was only the one Supreme Spirit dwelling in self-existence. "Desire, then, in the beginning (*agre*) arose in It, which was the earliest germ of mind, and wise men have beheld in their heart, not being ignorant, that this is the bond between *asat* and *sat.*" In the system of Kapila it is an unconscious impulse on the part of Prakriti, or instinctive desire to set the soul free from matter which causes the emanation of Prakriti into the manifold forms of developed life (*sat*). This latter was, in Kapila's view, an effect, because developed, and implying therefore a developing cause.

NOTE C

On the Connection of the Sankhya System with the Philosophy of Spinoza

The teaching of Spinoza has been unjustly described as a pure Atheism or as a system based on Materialism. This error has apparently arisen from his use of the word "substantia," which he is supposed to use to denote mere matter or gross body, in opposition to mind or spirit. He uses it, however, to denote absolute or infinite Being with infinite attributes, manifesting itself by modes or accidents (affectiones) in the manifold forms of the universe, and to this absolute substance or Being he gives the name God. To God he sometimes gives the name of Nature, as Kapila called his primal substance Prakriti. "Infinitum ens, quod Deum sive naturam, appellamus, eadem, qua existit, necessitate agit" (Eth. iv.). But he made a distinction between God as the source of formal existence and these existences themselves, calling the one *Natura naturans* and the other *Natura naturata.* God is the cause of all things, not of their existence merely, but of their essence, and this not transiently but immanently. God is the only substance, whether as *Natura naturans* or *Natura naturata.* Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be conceived, for as the Infinite Substance he is the source of all things, and they are contained in Him. Thus, as others who have attempted to solve the mysterious problem of the relation of the Infinite to the Finite, he forms only a kind

of Pantheism. It has been said that "Spinoza does not confound God with the material universe," but this is, in his system, a part of God: "Natura naturans et natura naturata in identitate Deus est." God has, indeed, two attributes, thought and expansion. "Cogitatio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans. Extensio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa" (*Eth.* 2). But here are not two distinct entities. God is the All. Extension is visible thought and thought is invisible extension, but He is the living whole. "Res particuleres nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et de terminato modo exprimuntur" (*Eth.* i.). God, however, is not corporeal. The universe is only a manifestation of his being. Body is only a mode of his attribute of extension, a passing form of his existence. All formal existence changes and dies; it is but a visible aspect of him who is unchangeable and eternal. He, the Infinite, exists in himself, and that which is finite exists in another, and cannot therefore be a representation of his nature. As Cousin has interpreted the idea: the universe is "the Deity passing into activity, but not exhausted by the act" (*Cours de Phil.* Intro.).

In his psychology Spinoza taught that the mind does not know itself, except so far as it receives ideas of sensation by the bodily organs; but these perceptions, which are primarily confused, become clear by the action of the mind in internal reflection. It is not, however, free in its action. It is determined by a cause, which is itself determined *ad infinitum* by some other cause. All things issue and are carried on by an eternal necessity. Even God does not act for some voluntary purpose, for this would indicate desire. He acts only from the necessity of his nature. As there is no free will and no really free action, for man is but a part of the general order whose laws cannot be disturbed, there is no absolute goodness or its opposite, and men have invented the names of goodness or virtue to denote such actions as tend to their benefit. God re really the cause of all things, even of our thoughts; of the latter by his attribute of thought, and of outward actions by his attribute of extension. Men attribute their actions to the determination of the mind, not knowing, in their ignorance, that the mind cannot think till it is impelled by the bodily organs, and our volitions are only our appetites which are connected with the body.

Spinoza taught that truth, *i.e.*, the just correlation of idea and fact, might be obtained. Ideas are obtained (1.) by the action of

the bodily senses ; (2,) in their generic form by imagination, *i.e.*, the remembrance of sensational ideas, which are classified by words ; (3.) by the logical faculty or reason ; and (4.) by intuition, as Schelling afterwards taught. Error arises from the confused and imperfect results of the first source of knowledge. There is no faculty of thought or of desire, as distinguished from the act, and both mind and body "are but one thing considered under different attributes." There is ultimately an identity, as in the system of Hegel, of subject and object, and this oneness is in God. It is not made evident how Spinoza reconciled the apparently opposite ideas of the spirituality of the Divine nature and the real existence of material forms. If the latter are only his visible aspect, a realisation of himself in the material world, and particular things are only modes of his attribute of extension, we have a near approach to the Vedantist doctrine of *maya* (illusion), which represents the whole of formal, material existence to be only an illusive manifestation of the One Supreme Spirit, who is himself the All.

It will be unnecessary to say to those who have read the "Sankhya Karika" that the system of Kapila is not the same as that of Spinoza ; but the latter, as an exposition of God and Nature, has a close resemblance to the theistic form of the Sankhya as set forth by Patanjali, and especially to this form of it as represented in the "Bhagavad Gita." In that work the One Supreme Being has a dual nature, a higher which is spiritual, and a lower which answers to the Prakriti of Kapila, and corresponds to the attributes of God—thought and expansion—in the system of Spinoza. The world of existing things is a manifestation of the Supreme Spirit in this lower attribute, coming forth at the will of the spiritual nature and again at the end of an age called a *kalpa,* dissolving into his all-containing self. All individual or formal existence is but the modal form in which the one spiritual essence makes itself manifest. All things issue from this source and are contained in it. As the ether pervades and encompasses all things, so the One pervades and encompasses all. Spinoza might have employed the language of the "Bhagavad Gita," and the author of this work might have taught, in the words of Spinoza, "Deum esse non tantum causam, ut res incipiant existere, sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent ; sive (ut termino scholastico utar), Deum esse causam essendi rerum' (Eth. i.) Both taught that the universe was an evolution, but not such an evolution as Darwin has endeavoured to prove—from the lowest point of being to its highest

state—but from the one highest or sole being to its lowest depths, there being a gradation from *buddhi* (intellect) down to inanimate matter. The one, in this gradation, ends where the other begins. The Hindu and the German philosopher moved, in other respects, in precisely the same lines of thought. Both taught that the mind or the soul knows itself only by the action of the ideas of sensation or sense-perceptions that originate in the bodily organs. There is no absolute self-consciousness.

In another conclusion the two systems agree. The fatalism which Spinoza asserted, though supported by a more imposing array of argument and more absolute in its kind, is maintained by the Hindu predecessor. According to the latter, the universe is only a vast machine, which is caused to revolve by the action of the One Being, in whom all existence is contained. All things are but the agents of his power ; and though virtue and vice have an essential difference from each other, yet a fatal necessity destroys, in fact, the barriers that, in the conscience of mankind, are placed between good and evil. Conscience has no part in either system. Man seeks only his own advantage, though in the system of Patanjali the highest good is obtained by an absorption into the divine essence by *yoga* (lit. union), the blending of the human with the divine, even in this life, by the force of constant meditation. The Diety has no concern with human actions, whether good or bad. The perfect man has no sympathy with his fellows. He lives in a state of complete isolation, in which all necessity for action and all sense of duty are entirely lost. The system of Spinoza leads to the same selfish exclusiveness ; for if men ought to seek only what is profitable or agreeable to them, or rather, must do so from the very necessity of their nature, there is no possibility of self-sacrifice or the abandonment of a personal gain for the benefit of others, either in their personal or national capacity. There is virtually no law, or no law but that of an unchangeable necessity, and all rightfulness and the sense of right or wrong are absolutely destroyed.

NOTE D

On the Connection of the System of Kapila with that of Schopenhaur and Von Hartmann

The philosophical system of Spinoza has many points in common with the theory of Patanjali, but the teaching of Kapila is more closely allied with the latest philosophy of Germany, as set forth by

Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (*The World as Will and Idea*) of the first, and the *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*) of the later. If we leave out of view Hartmann's poetical illustrations of his subject, by which he gives an unnatural brightness to a gloomy system, we shall find only a "philosophy of despair," an inarticulate cry, a wail of lametation in which there is no hope. There is absolutely none for man in his present conscious life. Its pleasures are chiefly a mere absence of pain, and pain metts us at every step. Riches bring with them many cares, together with much toil ; and labour—a thoroughly Hindu sentiment—is itself an evil. Love brings upon us embarrassments and disappointment ; it requires immense sacrifies ; it causes more pain than pleasure ; it is an "evil," or at best an "illusion." Nor can sympathy, as some falsely suppose, bring pleasure to the man who offers it : it is only another form of pain. Ambition is a mere delusion, a vain striving —which is itself an evil—for that which will only mock us if attained, and cause bitter sorrow if, as the course of affairs usually runs, we are left to pine in solitude for the unattained object of our dreams.

The pleasures of science and art are rarely obtained, and if they are won, they are only gained by much toil and continual sacrifice. The end, if gained, is not a compensation for the substantial evils of the method of our success ; and our intellectual elevation makes us only more sensitive of pain. A dog or an ox is happier, or rather less miserable, than man, for it has a lower sensibility in proportion as it has a duller intellect. Hope, indeed, remains, and might give a real enjoyment, but we have learned by experience that our hopes are deceptive : they only make our misearable state more sad and despairing from the false light which they throw around us for a while, leaving us, in their departure, immersed in a deeper darkness and at a lower depth. "Human life,' says Schopenhauer, "oscillates between pain and ennui, which two states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann says of love that "the sorrow of disappointment and the bitterness of betrayal continue infinitely longer than the happiness of the illusion." Kapila taught, also, that our present life is occupied and made miserable by pain, which comes upon mankind from three different sources. In the Sutras attributed to him it is declared that "the complete destruction of pain is the highest object of man" (i. 1). Pain is, therefore, the chief evil, if not, as Jeremy Bentham maintained, the only evil in the world, and

the sole purpose of the wise is to learn how it may be put away for ever. Virtue and vice are determined only by the tendency of actions to produce pleasure or pain. There is no absolute or moral difference ; in fact, morality may be discarded from our thoughts : the soul, in the system of Kapila—for he believed in the existence of souls—having no direct connection with virtue or vice, which are only material conditions. To strive for inward purity, or to contend for a noble purpose in our own lives or for the benefit of others, was not indeed to him, as to some modern philosophers, a work of folly or delusion, but it was not held to be man's highest or most necessary purpose. This is found only in the attainment of the knowledge by which the soul may be freed from all contact with matter, that by such means pain may be destroyed. There is no greatness in the suffering of pain, no moral elevation in sharing the pains or the sorrows of others. Philosophy began, as it ends, by seeking only to obtain a painless, untroubled life.

If now the question be put, How was this state of misery produced ? the answer in the two systems is substantially the same. The nature of the kosmos is explained in different terms, but in each the sum of existent things has been developed from a primary unconscious substance or force, which Schopenhauer describes as Will, of which the world is an objective manifestation, and which Hartmann calls "the Unconscious.' This is the all-containing principal or primal source of all formal existence, the *ule* of the Greeks. "The Unconsciousness is the ultimate principle of all existence ; it enters into all organic forces, into all our bodily movements and our mental processes; it guides man through all the stages of his life, and without man's knowledge it directs his steps so as to realise its plans ; it lies at the root and forms the essence of both matter and spirit ; they are therefore identical, and only different aspects of the self-same substance."[1] If we substitute mind as the formative power or faculty of ideas for spirit, this would serve for a description of the Prakriti of Kapila. This is the universal primordial monad, from which have emanated all the different states of mind and matter. It enfolds and animates all things, and all things will be finally absorbed and lost in it. In its primary state it was in a condition of equilibrium, and there was no development of formal existence while it con-

[1] See an article on the "Philosophy of Pessimism" in the *Westminister Review,* January, 1876.

tinued in that state. How then was this passive state brought to an end and the beginning of the existing kosmos produced? The answer of Kapila is that the proximity of Prakriti (Nature) to Soul gave rise to an unconscious movement of Nature's constitutent elements, that by their consequent unfolding into the forms of material life the Soul might know the existence of matter and be subsequently free from all contact with it. The Soul thus knows itself and gains its natural state of isolation. All existing things have been formed for this purpose. So says Hegel: "Everything in heaven and earth aims only at this—that the soul may know itself, may make itself its object, and close together with itself." The doctrine of Schopenhauer is that everything, physical or mental, is an emanation of that mysterious force called Will, which has thus changed itself from subject to object, and that this includes all things and all beings, so that the idea of self or indiduality is an illusion. Hartmann represents the Unconscious as the unity of Will and Idea, the latter being the object which the Will unconsciously seeks to realise. The Idea has no separate existence *per se,* and here we come very near the Vedantist doctrine of *maya* (illusion). Schopenhauer, however, says that "absence of end belongs to the nature of Will *per se,* which is an endless striving" (*Die Welt als Wille,* &c.). From neither do we learn how the world of existent things came to be developed from this unknown power called Will, but the German philosophers agree with Kapila in maintaining that the primary essence or substance was unconscious, and that the conscious life has been developed from it. Hartmann speaks of the Unconcious as being properly that which is above consciousness (*das Ueberbewusste*), and that an individual consciousness is a limitation and defect. Its birth is explained in language which is probably as strange as any that the science of mental physiology has ever known: "Before the rise of consciousness, mind can, in its own nature, have no other presentations and ideas than those which are called into being through Will and form its content. Suddenly organised matter breaks in upon this peace of the Unconscious with itself"—as in the system of Kapila the external world is presented to the soul by *Buddhi* (Intellect)—"and impresses on the astonished individual mind, in the necessary reaction of the sensation, a conception which falls upon it as it were from heaven, because it finds within itself no Will for this idea; for the first time the content of intuition is given it from outside" (*Phil. d. Unb.,* p. 394). Consciousness is, therefore, the

surprise of the unconscious Will in an individual mind at the presence of an idea which the senses present.

Kapila has not ventured upon such flights of fancy, but he preceded Schopenhauer and Hartmann in asserting that the misery of our present state is due to the fact of our conscious life, for this has arisen from material developments which cause pain, and this can be put away only when consciousness has ceased to exist. When the soul has gained a complete isolation, then all conscious life is absorbed into the unconscious Prakriti. Freedom from pain can only be obtained by the destruction of this conscious life, and the aim of the wise is to obtain by knowledge the primitive state of unconsciousness. Schopenhauer and Hartmann teach the same doctrine. There is no remedy for the misery of the world in anything that belongs to our present life. It has its root in consciousness, which is found in every kind of formal existence, even the lowest, but has its highest development in man, and hence he is supremely wretched. But the remedy for the evil is not suicide : this affects only the individual ; it cannot benefit the race. "The basis of all man's being is want, defect, and pain. Since he is the most complete objective form of will, he is by that same fact the most defective of all beings. His life is only a continual struggle for existence, with the certainty of being beaten" (*Die Welt als Wille*). How, then, is the world to be delivered from this state of wretchedness? The answer is : (1.) By a knowledge of the fact that the world in its present form is wholly and unalterably bad. This answers to Kapila's statement that our deliverance from pain can only be gained by knowledge. (2.) By the abandonment of desire, the that all things may be absorbed into the unconscious. Thus the whole of present formal existence will pass away for ever. The world, as it now is, was an irrational development of will. "As man becomes penetrated with the idea of the misery of existence, and the feeling gains strength through heredity ; as people become more capable of co-operation, the greater portion of the active spirit in the world will adopt the resolution to destroy the act of will, and the world will have vanished into nothingness. The unconscious will return to that passive state of pure self-satisfied intelligence from which it never should have passed; and the possibility of another world, with all the miseries of this, will be for ever exhausted and exterminated" (*West. Rev.*, p. 159). In the system of Kapila this that of unconsciousness, of calm and eternal repose, is gained by the soul when absolutely freed from

contact with matter, and the whole of formal or developed existence will be absorbed into the formless, unconscious Prakriti. Hartmann, too, asserts a true *Nirvana,* the extinction of all conscious personal life as the final goal which the wise will seek to obtain. The Hindu and the German philosopher alike maintain that there is no hope for the world by any process of amendment. The labours of statesmen and philantropists are in vain. The only sufficient and abiding cure of its woes is the annihilation of all individual life. The last act of the great drama, which we are to expect eagerly, ends in the universal destruction of the present order, and the world, with all its miseries, will pass away for ever. The German philosopher has a more Vedantist leaning than Kapila. The unconscous that will reabsorb all existence in itself bears a close resemblance to the supreme Brahma, who is the efficient and material cause of all created things, or rather they are, as the Vedantists say, himself in certain deceptive forms, which shall finally disappear, and all life, as at the beginning, shall be absorbed and contained in him. Renan anticipates a similar result as the conclusion of the existing world. "We imagine a state of the world in which everything would end alike in a single conscious centre in which the universe would be reduced to a single existence, in which the idea of a personal monotheism would be a truth. A Being omniscient and omnipotent might be the last term of the deific evolution, whether we conceive him as rejoicing in all (all also repoicing in him), according to the dream of the Christian mysticism, os as an individuality attaining to a supreme force, or as the resultant of tens of thousands of beings, as the harmony, the total voice of the universe. The universe would be thus consummated in a single organised being, in whose infinitude would be resumed millions of millions of lives, past and present, at the same time." This sole Being is further described in language which, from its united grandeur and grotesqueness, might have been written in the East, and will remind the Sanskrit scholar of the description of the Supreme Being in the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita: "Only a small part of matter is now organised, and that which is organised is organised feebly; but we may admit an age in which all matter may be organised, in which thousands of suns joined together would serve to form a single being, sentient, rejoicing, absorbing by his burning throat a river of pleasure which would flow from him in a torrent of life. This living universe would present the two poles which every ner-

vous mass presents, the pole which feels and the pole which enjoys. Now, the universe thinks and rejoices by millions of individuals. One day a colossal mouth would give a sense of the infinite (*savourerait l'infini*), an ocean of intoxicating delight (*un ocean d'vresse*) would flow into it ; an inexhaustible emission of life, knowing neither repose nor fatigue, would spring up throughout eternity. To coagulate this divine mass the earth will probably have been taken and spoiled as a clod that one crushes without care of the ant or the work which conceals itself there."[2] Is this philosophy or a dream? Kapila and Hartman had substantially the same theory, but the exercise of their imagination was less bold and vivid than that of the Frenchman. But, however expressed, whether in the obscure brevity of Iswara Krishna, or in the subtle but flowing arguments and illustrations of Hartmann, or the imaginative flights of Renan, the theory is substantially the same. All existent things have issued from the One ; this emanation into separate and conscious forms of being has been the cause of unnumbered woes ; and this state of misery can only be put away by the absorption of all personal, conscious life in though served in time by more than two thousand years, speak its primal source. The oldest and thelatest system of philosophy, though severed in time by more than two thousands years, Speak with the same voice ; but they give no hope to man, for his highest ambition or his only refuge from misery lies in his personality being destroyed for ever.

THE END

[2] *Dialogues Philosophiques Trois,* trois, dial (Reves), pp. 125-128.

॥ श्री ॥

साङ्ख्यकारिका

सटिप्पणगौडपादभाष्यसहिता

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे सापार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥
दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥
मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥
दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥
प्रतिविषयाध्यावसायो दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकमाप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥
सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥
अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥
सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपब्धिर्नाभावात्कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥
असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्व सम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥
दहेतुमनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयबं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथाप्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ।। ११ ।।
प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्यौऽन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ।। १२ ।।
सत्त्वं लघू प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलञ्च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ।। १३ ।।
अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥
भेदानां परिमाणात्समन्वयाच्छक्तितः प्रवृत्तश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभाद्वैश्वरूपस्य ॥ १५ ॥
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत्प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥
सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषाऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥
जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥
तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥
तस्यात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासानः ॥ २० ॥
पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं वैकल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥
प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रुपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥
अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥
सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥
(१) बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपरथान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥
उभयात्मकमत्र मनः सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियञ्च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं वाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥
रूपादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥
स्वालक्षण्ं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥
युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
दृष्टे, तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्म तत्पूर्विका वृत्ति ॥ ३० ॥
स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥
करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधा हार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यञ्च ॥ ३२ ॥
अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतका ं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च बिशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषास्तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपयोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टा करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिस्तु करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्राऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात्पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

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